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LEARNING FROM MORE THAN FIVE-AND-
A-HALF DECADES OF FEDERAL WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL LEGISLATION: 
TWENTY LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Kenneth M. Murchison*
Abstract: Since 1948, the federal government has assumed an increas-
ingly dominant role in efforts to control pollution of surface waters in 
the United States. Over that half century, the federal role has evolved 
from research support and ªnancial grants to states, to federal efºuent 
standards and a national permit requirement, and, more recently, to en-
forcement of a mandate to achieve water quality standards. 
 This Article describes the evolution of federal water pollution control 
legislation in the United States. It focuses particularly on the 1972 stat-
ute prescribing feasibility-based controls for point sources and its 1977 
modiªcation, the increasing concern with toxic pollution in the 1980s, 
and recent litigation requiring total maximum daily loads for waters 
that fail to meet water quality standards. The Article then examines this 
description to evaluate the accomplishments and failures of each step in 
the legislative evolution, and to extract practical lessons so that future 
water pollution control legislation may be successful. 
Introduction 
 In the United States, federal water pollution control legislation 
has evolved signiªcantly over the last ªve-and-a-half decades. Since 
1948, the federal government has assumed an increasingly dominant 
role in efforts to control the pollution of surface waters. During that 
period, the federal role has evolved from research support and 
ªnancial grants to federal efºuent standards and a national permit 
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requirement and, more recently, to a mandate that water quality stan-
dards be achieved. 
 Engaging in a review of this statutory development, and its im-
plementation by administrators and courts, can advance understand-
ing of the regulatory process and suggest ways it might be improved. 
At a minimum, an examination of prior regulatory initiatives serves as 
a reminder of how water pollution control law has arrived at its cur-
rent equilibrium—an equilibrium that can be characterized as want-
ing in many respects. In addition, the successes and failures of the 
past can offer lessons regarding what strategies may work to control 
water pollution, and other forms of pollution, in the future. 
 This Article begins by describing the evolution of the federal leg-
islation. It focuses particularly on the 1972 statute prescribing feasibil-
ity-based controls for point sources, the modiªcations of the 1972 law 
in 1977 and in the 1980s, and recent litigation requiring total maxi-
mum daily loads for waters that fail to meet water quality standards. 
 This descriptive section sets the stage for the analytical contribu-
tion. The Article evaluates the accomplishments and failures of each 
step in the evolution of water pollution control law. It then uses the 
description and evaluation to generate some practical lessons for suc-
cessful legislation. Some of these lessons may be useful in the present; 
others may be guides best called upon in a political, economic, or 
technological climate yet to arrive. In addition, because water pollu-
tion control legislation has used a range of different strategies for en-
vironmental regulation, these lessons have potential application to 
other environmental statutes as well. 
I. Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation in  
the United States 
A. Regulation Prior to 1972 
1. Legislation 
 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized extensive 
federal power over navigable waters. As early as 1824, the Court 
broadly deªned congressional authority to control the use of waters in 
interstate commerce.1 For most of the nation’s history, Congress ex-
                                                                                                                      
1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). For general discussions of the 
authority the Commerce Clause grants Congress to enact pollution control regulations, see 
Sidney Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power to Abate 
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ercised its authority over waterways by regulating the “navigable wa-
ters” of the United States. Moreover, the Supreme Court broadly 
deªned that phrase.2 By the twentieth century, it included waters that 
had been navigable in the past,3 waters capable of being used for in-
terstate commerce with reasonable improvements,4 and nonnavigable 
tributaries that affect navigable streams.5
 Congress delayed signiªcant federal pollution control legislation 
until the middle of the twentieth century.6 Nonetheless, one nine-
teenth century statute—the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 
18997—was important in shaping modern legislation. Section 13 of 
that statute, 8  commonly known as the Refuse Act, prohibited dis-
charging refuse into navigable waters or their tributaries. To give the 
prohibition some teeth, section 16 of the 1899 law9 made any viola-
tion of the Refuse Act a misdemeanor punishable by a ªne of $500 to 
$2500 and imprisonment for not more than thirty days; it also pro-
                                                                                                                      
Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1067 (1965); Christine A. Klein, The 
Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Albert J. Rosenthal, The 
Federal Power to Protect the Environment: Available Devices to Compel or Induce Desired Conduct, 45 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 397, 398–402 (1972); Philip Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environ-
mental Law, in Federal Environmental Law 20, 22–27 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G.P. 
Guilbert eds., 1974). For the argument that Congress needs broader authority than the 
Commerce Clause, see Oliver Houck, Environmental Law and the General Welfare, 16 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 11–14 (1998). 
2 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). See generally Frank L. Mara-
ist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Admiralty in a Nutshell 19–24 (4th ed. 2001); Frank 
L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Personal Injury in Admiralty § 2-2 (2000); 1 
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-3 (3d ed. 2001). 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 57 (1926). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. 311 U.S. 377, 417 (1940). 
5 See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525–26 (1941). 
6 See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—
State, Local and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972: Part I, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 145, 157 (2003); see 
also N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality Part III: The 
Federal Effort, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 799, 805–08 (1967). For a survey of state and local water 
pollution control efforts prior to 1948, see Andreen, supra, at 160–89. 
7 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codiªed as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401–418 (2000)). See generally William L. Andreen, The Evolution 
of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972: Part 
II, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 215, 220–22 (2003); Diane D. Eames, Comment, The Refuse Act of 
1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water Pollution, 58 Cal. L. Rev. 1444 (1970). 
8 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 § 13 (Refuse Act of 1899), 30 Stat. at 
1152 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407). 
9 Id. § 16, 30 Stat. at 1153 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 411). The maximum 
penalty under the 1899 statute was a $2500 ªne and imprisonment for one year. A 1996 
amendment, Water Resources Development Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303, sec. 218(a), 
§ 16, 110 Stat. 3658, 3696, eliminated the minimum ªne and raised the maximum ªne to 
$25,000 per day of violation. 
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vided that one-half of the ªne was “to be paid to the person or per-
sons giving information which shall lead to conviction.”10
 The current codiªcation of section 13 of the Refuse Act11 is a 
long and convoluted sentence; it contains two prohibitions and ends 
with a qualiªcation and a pair of provisos. The ªrst prohibition makes 
it unlawful to discharge “any refuse matter” into navigable waters or 
their tributaries except for “that ºowing from streets and sewers and 
passing therefrom in a liquid state.”12 The second prohibition forbids 
anyone from depositing “material of any kind . . . on the bank of any 
navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable wa-
ter” when the material “shall be liable to be washed into such naviga-
ble water.”13 At the end of the second prohibition, Congress inserted 
the qualifying phrase “whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or 
obstructed.”14 Finally, the sentence concludes with two provisos. The 
ªrst exempts federal public works from the statutory prohibitions.15 
The second authorizes the Chief of the Corps of Engineers to allow 
“the deposit of any material above mentioned in navigable waters.”16
 The story of modern federal legislation begins with the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.17 The 1948 Act “assigned the 
federal government to a very secondary position in relation to the 
states in water quality matters, the principal federal responsibility be-
ing to bolster local pollution control programs with technical services 
and money.”18 The new law authorized federal support for research 
on water pollution problems,19 loans to help ªnance treatment facili-
ties,20 and ªnancial grants to state water pollution control programs.21 
Although the 1948 Act encouraged states to enact uniform laws and 
                                                                                                                      
10 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 § 16, 30 Stat. at 1153 (codiªed as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 411). 
11 See 33 U.S.C. § 407. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. 
16 Id. 
17 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155. See 
generally Frank J. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act: A Study of the Difªculty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1103, 
1104–07 (1970); Hines, supra note 6, at 809–13. For a summary of efforts to enact federal 
legislation prior to 1948, see Hines, supra note 6, at 805–08. 
18 Hines, supra note 6, at 810. 
19 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 § 2, 62 Stat. at 1155. 
20 Id. § 5, 62 Stat. at 1158. 
21 Id. § 8, 62 Stat. at 1159. 
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interstate compacts,22 it explicitly recognized—in words that remain 
part of contemporary law 23—that water pollution control was primar-
ily the responsibility of state and local governments.24 The 1948 legis-
lation included a narrow authorization for federal enforcement ac-
tion.25 It allowed the federal government to ªle a public nuisance 
action for interstate pollution that endangered persons in a state 
other than the one in which the pollution originated. However, the 
federal government could proceed only with the approval of state 
ofªcials in the state where the discharge originated and after a com-
plicated series of notices, warnings, hearings, and conference recom-
mendations.26
 Congress expanded the federal statute in 1956.27 The most sig-
niªcant aspect of the 1956 amendments authorized direct funding for 
municipal sewerage treatment plants.28 The amendments also modi-
ªed the provision allowing the federal government to act against in-
terstate pollution by deleting the requirement for approval of the 
state in which the discharge originated and by eliminating one of the 
notice requirements in the abatement procedure. 29  Unfortunately, 
Congress also narrowed the deªnition of “interstate waters”30 and ne-
gated the impact of the deletion of the notice requirement by adding 
a new requirement for a conference of local and state ofªcials and 
two new delays in the process.31
 Additional amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act in 196132 made modest alterations in the statute.33 The amend-
ments increased the appropriation authority for grants to state pro-
                                                                                                                      
22 Id. § 2, 62 Stat. at 1156. 
23 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000) 
24 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 § 1, 62 Stat. at 1155. 
25 See id. § 2, 62 Stat. at 1156–57. 
26 See Hines, supra note 6, at 812. 
27 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat. 498. 
See generally Andreen, supra note 7, at 239–41; Barry, supra note 17, at 1107–12; Hines, su-
pra note 6, at 813–19. 
28 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, sec. 1, § 6, 70 Stat. at 502. 
29 Id. § 8, 70 Stat. at 504–05. 
30 Id. § 11(e), 70 Stat. at 506; see Barry, supra note 17, at 1109–11. 
31 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, sec. 1, § 8, 70 Stat. at 504. For a 
more complete description of the enforcement process, see Barry, supra note 17, at 1108–
09. 
32 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 
Stat. 204. 
33 See generally Andreen, supra note 7, at 241–44; Barry, supra note 17, at 1112–14; 
Hines, supra note 6, at 822–25. 
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grams34 as well as the dollar ceiling on federal construction grants,35 
and they broadened the deªnition of “interstate or navigable waters” 
to include all coastal waters.36 With respect to enforcement, Congress 
increased the federal government’s power to initiate enforcement 
conferences, although it required that the conference be requested by 
the governor of the state where the discharge originated.37 The 1961 
legislation also allowed municipalities to initiate requests for federal 
enforcement, but only when they obtained the concurrence of the 
governor or the state water pollution control agency.38
 The Water Quality Act of 196539 substantially expanded the scope 
of federal regulatory authority.40 It directed states to establish water 
quality standards for interstate waters41 and to prepare implementa-
tion plans imposing pollution controls that would achieve the water 
quality standards.42 The amendments also required the states to sub-
mit their standards to the newly created Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Administration for approval,43 but the new federal statute did not 
mandate enforceable regulations on individual sources of pollution. 
Moreover, when a state failed to act, the statute did not grant the ad-
ministrator authority to impose and enforce a federal implementation 
plan.44
 In 1966, Congress again amended the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act. The principal feature of the Clean Water Restoration Act 
of 196645 was a substantial increase in the authorization for federal 
                                                                                                                      
34 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, sec. 3, § 4, 75 Stat. at 
205. 
35 Id. sec. 5, § 6, 75 Stat. at 206. 
36 Id. sec. 9, § 11, 75 Stat. at 210. 
37 Id. sec. 7, § 8, 75 Stat. at 208. 
38 Id. 
39 Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903. 
40 See generally Andreen, supra note 7, at 244–50; Barry, supra note 17, at 1114–16; 
Hines, supra note 6, at 825–30. 
41 Water Quality Act of 1965, sec. 5, § 10, 79 Stat. at 907–08. 
42 Id. § 10, 79 Stat. at 908. 
43 Id. 
44 When a state failed to adopt water quality standards for interstate waters within its 
borders, the statute authorized the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to prepare 
water quality standards. If the state failed to adopt acceptable standards after the Secretary 
proposed federal standards, the Secretary could promulgate the federal standards. Id. At 
this point, however, the state could request a hearing on the federal standards. Even after 
the federal standards were promulgated, the statute did not authorize the Secretary to 
prepare a federal implementation plan to insure that the standards were achieved. See id. 
45 Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246. See generally 
Andreen, supra note 7, at 250–52; Barry, supra note 17, at 1116–17; Hines, supra note 6, at 
833–38. In the 1966 law, Congress also amended the Oil Pollution Act to include inland 
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construction grants for public waste treatment facilities.46 In addition, 
the 1966 statute increased federal support for research and training 
efforts,47 authorized larger grants to support local and state agencies 
responsible for water pollution control, 48  provided incentives for 
states to adopt water quality standards49 and to support construction 
of local waste treatment works,50 and permitted the use of federal en-
forcement machinery for international boundary waters.51
 Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act one 
more time before 1972. The 1970 amendment was a response to two 
oil spills. One spill resulted from the wrecking of the Torrey Canyon off 
the coast of Great Britain in 1967, and the other occurred in 1969 
when oil escaped from a platform in the ocean near Santa Barbara, 
California. The legislation did not, however, change the basic struc-
ture of water pollution control regulations. Instead, the Water Quality 
Improvement Act of 197052 established a system of strict liability for 
oil spills.53
                                                                                                                      
waters within its coverage, Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, sec. 211, § 2, 80 Stat. at 
1252–53, and to transfer responsibility for administering the Act to the Secretary of Inte-
rior. Id. Federal provisions governing oil spills have remained a unique area of law. See infra 
notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
46 Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, sec. 201, § 6, 80 Stat. at 1247. 
47 Id. sec. 201, 80 Stat. at 1246–47. 
48 Id. sec. 205, 80 Stat. at 1250. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. sec. 210, 80 Stat. at 1252. 
51 Id. sec. 211, 80 Stat. at 1253–54. 
52 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (codiªed 
prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. §§ 466, 1152, 1155–1156, 1158, 1160–1175 (1970)). See 
generally Andreen, supra note 7, at 257–58; Douglas Meiklejohn, Note, Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 973 (1970). 
53 Special provisions establishing liability for oil spills on navigable waters have contin-
ued to the present. Two years after passing the 1970 Act, Congress integrated it into sec-
tion 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, § 311, 86 Stat. 816, 862 
(codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976)). In 1978, Congress amended 
section 311 to extend its coverage to hazardous substances as well as oil. Act of Nov. 2, 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-576, sec. (b), § 311(b), 92 Stat. 2467, 2467–68 (1978) (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1321 (2000)). Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, Congress substantially 
increased the liability of owners and operators of vessels and added new regulatory provi-
sions for the design of oil tankers in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 
104 Stat. 484 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 2701–2750 (2000)). See generally 
Paul S. Edelman, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 8 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Benjamin H. 
Grumbles, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Mixing Oil, Water, and Hazardous Waste, 4 Geo. Int’l 
Envtl. L. Rev. 151 (1991). 
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2. Interpretation and Enforcement 
 Not surprisingly, the 1970 legislation and its predecessors achieved 
limited results in improving the quality of the nation’s waters. By 1972, 
approximately half of the states had adopted water quality standards, 
but the federal legislation failed to compel meaningful progress toward 
achieving those standards.54  Furthermore, the limited authority and 
complicated procedures for federal enforcement had proved ineffec-
tive.55 According to a report prepared by the Senate Committee on 
Public Works, the federal government initiated only one enforcement 
action under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act prior to 1970.56
 Because the enforcement procedures were so ineffective, the De-
partment of Justice instead used the Refuse Act as the basis for legal 
actions against polluters. During the 1960s, two Supreme Court deci-
sions expanded the potential of the Refuse Act as a pollution control 
statute. The two cases contributed to the political momentum that 
ultimately produced the political compromise reºected in modern 
federal water pollution control legislation.57
 In the ªrst case, the Supreme Court in 1960 narrowly construed 
the Refuse Act exemption for liquid sewerage from streets and sew-
ers.58 According to the majority opinion authored by Justice Douglas, 
the exemption did not apply to suspended solids in the discharge of 
an industrial plant.59 As a result, the discharge fell within the statute’s 
general prohibition against discharging refuse into the navigable wa-
ters.60 In addition, the Court also ruled that the United States could 
                                                                                                                      
54 Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Pol-
icy 578 (4th ed. 2003). 
55 See Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases that 
Changed the American Landscape, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2279, 2284–85 (1996). 
56 S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672. Following 
the adoption of the 1972 Amendments, the Nevada District Court liberally construed the 
pre-1972 law to allow an abatement action against a county and two sanitary districts. See 
United States v. Douglas County, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,727 (D. Nev. 1973). 
57 See infra note 70 and accompanying text. See generally Houck, supra note 55, at 2282–
91 (1996); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second 
Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (1971); William C. Stefªn, Note, The Refuse 
Act of 1899: New Tasks for an Old Law, 22 Hastings L. J. 782 (1971). 
58 See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485 (1960). The Court also 
held that the discharge was an “obstruction” to navigation and thus violated section 10 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 
(codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000)). 
59 Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 490–91. 
60 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000); see supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
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seek injunctive relief against violators even though neither section 13 
nor section 16 expressly authorized an injunction.61
 Justice Douglas continued his expansive interpretation of the Re-
fuse Act six years later. The new decision62 broadly deªned the “re-
fuse” that could not be discharged into navigable waters.63 According 
to Justice Douglas, commercially valuable gasoline that was inadver-
tently spilled into a waterway was refuse that fell within the statutory 
prohibition.64
 When the Supreme Court rendered its opinions construing the 
Refuse Act, the Corps of Engineers lacked a program for permitting 
discharges that did not impede navigation.65 Thus, the effect of the 
decisions was to render unlawful (indeed, criminal) virtually all indus-
trial discharges into the navigable waters of the United States and 
their tributaries and to authorize a bounty of one-half of the ªne for 
citizens who provided information that led to conviction.66 Unfortu-
nately, however, even the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of 
the Refuse Act left two major sources of water pollution unregulated. 
No decisions had interpreted runoff from agricultural and other 
nonpoint sources to be either a “discharge” or a “deposit” of refuse 
material, and untreated municipal discharges fell within the “liquid 
sewerage” exception to the statute. Furthermore, the unwieldy en-
forcement mechanism of lawsuits initiated by the Justice Department 
against individual polluters made the Refuse Act an unlikely vehicle 
for signiªcant improvement in the quality of the nation’s waterways. 
 The Supreme Court’s activism with respect to water pollution 
continued to the eve of congressional reform of federal water pollu-
tion control legislation. In addition to construing the Refuse Act 
                                                                                                                      
61 Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 485. 
62 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966). 
63 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000); see supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
64 Standard Oil, 384 U.S. at 225–26, 237. 
65 According to one commentator, the corps had issued only 266 permits under sec-
tion 13 as of August 1970. Stefªn, supra note 57, at 788. In December of 1970, President 
Nixon directed the Corps of Engineers to develop an expanded permit program, and the 
corps issued ªnal regulations in April 1971. See Permits for Discharges or Deposits into 
Navigable Waters, 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Apr. 7, 1971) (codiªed at 33 C.F.R. § 209.131). How-
ever, a federal district court brought the program to a halt in December 1971 when it re-
quired the corps to develop rules for complying with the National Environmental Policy 
Act before issuing any permits. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 14–15 (D.D.C. 1971). See 
generally Andreen supra note 7, at 258–60. 
66 See 2 William H. Rodgers, Environmental Law: Air and Water § 4-11 (1994); 
Houck, supra note 55, at 2289–90. But see Rodgers, supra note 57, at 792–806 (criticizing 
the Department of Justice guidelines that enforced the Refuse Act). 
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broadly, the Court also allowed claims based on the federal common 
law of nuisance when water pollution problems were interstate in na-
ture. Less than seven months before Congress amended the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act in October 1972, the Supreme Court 
ruled that a federal district court had jurisdiction over a claim that the 
city of Milwaukee was dumping raw sewerage into Lake Michigan.67 
The common law solution proved a limited one, however. When the 
Milwaukee case returned to the Supreme Court nine years later, the 
Court ruled that the 1972 Amendments had preempted the state’s 
claim insofar as it was based on the federal common law.68 Six years 
after the second Milwaukee case, the Supreme Court further limited 
the role for common law remedies. It ruled that the only common law 
claims that survived the enactment of the Clean Water Act were those 
provided by the state in which the pollution discharge originated.69
B. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
 The Supreme Court decisions construing the Refuse Act helped 
to make possible the compromise that led to the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972.70 The 1972 Amendments re-
placed the twenty-four-year-old statute with an entirely new “Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act” (the Act or the 1972 Act), establishing 
the modern structure of federal water pollution control legislation 
and the statutory numbering system used to the present day.71 Indus-
trial dischargers wanted a permit system to avoid possible criminal 
                                                                                                                      
67 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972). For a brief description of earlier 
cases involving the federal common law of nuisance, see Kenneth M. Murchison, Interstate 
Pollution: The Need for Federal Common Law, 6 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 1, 10–11 (1986). 
68 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). 
69 Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497–98 (1987). 
70 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816–904 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (2000)). See generally Andreen, supra note 7, at 260–86; Charles W. Smith, Highlights of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 77 Dick. L. Rev. 459 (1973); Robert Zener, The 
Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in Federal Environmental Law 682, 683–770 (Erica 
L. Dolgin & Thomas G. P. Guilbert eds., 1974); Jeffrey M. Lipman, Note, The Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Effective Controls at Last?, 39 Brook. L. Rev. 403 
(1972); Frederick Rasmussen, Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 893. 
71 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). Its popularly 
adopted appellation, “Clean Water Act,” was not formally acknowledged until the amend-
ments of 1977. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. Section 2 of the 1972 Act con-
tains the entire reenactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with its modern 
numbering system. Because section 2 covers 80 pages in the Statutes at Large, the citations 
to the 1972 Act in the footnotes that follow include a reference to the speciªc section of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as well as to section 2 of the 1972 Amendments. 
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liability under the absolute prohibition of the Refuse Act. Environ-
mental groups also advocated a new statute to address perceived 
deªciencies in the 1899 law: they favored expanding federal pollution 
control jurisdiction to reach beyond the navigable waters of the 
United States; they wanted the newly created Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), rather than the Corps of Engineers, to regulate 
the discharge of pollutants; they sought the elimination of the mu-
nicipal sewerage exclusion in the Refuse Act; and they wanted a more 
effective enforcement regime. Congress gained the support of local 
governments for the new legislation by promising to increase funding 
for publicly owned treatment works (often referred to as POTWs). 
Finally, farming interests supported the new statute because Congress 
drastically limited its impact on farming operations. 
 These political compromises shaped the 1972 Amendments, which 
were enacted over President Nixon’s veto.72 The absolute ban in the 
Refuse Act73 remained in section 101 of the 1972 legislation as a “na-
tional goal” that the discharge of pollutants be eliminated by 1985,74 in 
section 301 as authority for EPA to set no-discharge standards for exist-
ing sources when “technologically and economically achievable,”75 in 
section 306 as a direction for EPA to impose no-discharge standards for 
new sources “where practicable,”76 and in section 307 as a provision 
allowing EPA to prohibit the discharge of toxic pollutants.77 However, 
                                                                                                                      
72 President Nixon vetoed the legislation because of his opposition to the increase in 
federal funding for publicly owned treatment works. See 118 Cong. Rec. 36,859 (1972). He 
continued his opposition in implementing the statute, but the Supreme Court ultimately 
ruled that the President lacked authority to refuse to allot moneys that Congress had ap-
propriated for construction grants. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975). 
73 See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000); supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 
11–16 and accompanying text. 
74 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
sec. 2, § 101(a)(1), 86 Stat. 816, 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2000)); see also 
id. § 402, 86 Stat. at 880 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342) (naming the new federal permit 
program the “National pollutant discharge elimination system”) (emphasis added). Even 
the no-discharge goal was less absolute than its language might initially suggest. The goal 
was to eliminate “the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters” by 1985. Although 
the Act broadly deªned “navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the United States,” id. 
§ 502(7), 86 Stat. at 886 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)), the term “discharge of a pol-
lutant” covered only discharges from “point source[s].” Id. § 502(12), 86 Stat. at 886 
(codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)). 
75  Id. § 301(b)(2), 86 Stat. 816, 845 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(b)(2) (1976)). 
76 Id. § 306(a)(1), 86 Stat. at 854–55 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (2000)). 
77 Id. § 307(a)(2), 86 Stat. at 856–57 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(a)(2) (1976)). 
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the regulatory prohibition of section 301(a) 78  applied only to dis-
charges from “point sources,”79 and section 301 in fact allowed dis-
charges from point sources so long as the discharger complied with the 
substantive requirements of the Act and obtained the permit required 
by the statute.80 The requirements of the new legislation reached all 
“navigable waters,” a term that included all “waters of the United States, 
including the territorial seas.”81 Moreover, Congress gave EPA respon-
sibility for establishing federal efºuent standards,82 administering the 
federal permit program for pollution discharges,83 and enforcing the 
federal standards.84 The substantive and procedural requirements of 
the 1972 Amendments applied to municipal discharges,85 but a new 
                                                                                                                      
78 Id. § 301(a), 86 Stat. at 844 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000)). 
79 Id. § 502(14), 86 Stat. at 887 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)) (“The 
term ‘point source’ means any discernible, conªned, and discrete conveyance, including 
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete ªssure, con-
tainer, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other ºoating 
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”). A 1977 amendment, Clean Water 
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec. 33(b), 91 Stat. 1566, 1577, added an additional sen-
tence excluding return ºows from irrigated agriculture from the deªnition, and a 1987 
amendment, Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, sec. 502, § 502(14), 101 Stat. 7, 
75, further excluded agricultural stormwater discharges. See infra note 234 and accompany-
ing text. 
80 A careful reading of section 301 shows that the regulatory prohibition is not as abso-
lute as it appears. “[T]he discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful,” ac-
cording to section 301(a), “[e]xcept as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 
306, 307, 318, 402, and 404.” Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
sec. 2, § 301(a), 86 Stat. at 844 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). However, 
the deªnition of “discharge of a pollutant” limits the phrase to discharges from point 
sources, thus exempting nonpoint sources of water pollution from the prohibition. More-
over, the exception at the beginning of the subsection has the effect of allowing discharges 
from point sources so long as the discharges comply with the substantive standards of sec-
tions 302, 306, 307, and 318, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328; see infra notes 88–89, 
115–41 and accompanying text, and the permit requirements of sections 402 and 404, 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344; see infra notes 99–103, 148–55, 168–70 and accompanying text. 
As the discussion in the text indicates, the most substantial of the substantive requirements 
were feasibility-based. 
81 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 502(7), 86 Stat. 
at 886 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)). 
82 Id. §§ 301(b), 304, 86 Stat. at 844, 850 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311(b), 1314 (1976)). 
83 Id. § 402, 86 Stat. at 880 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000)). But see 
id. § 404, 86 Stat. at 884 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344) (giving Corps of Engi-
neers authority to issue permits for the deposit of dredge and ªll material). 
84 Id. § 309, 86 Stat. at 859 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319). 
85  See id. § 301(b)(1)(B), 86 Stat. at 845 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(b)(1)(B)) (requiring that existing publicly owned treatment works achieve 
efºuent limits based on secondary treatment by July 1, 1977); id. § 502(6), 86 Stat. at 886 
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grant program raised the federal share of the construction costs for 
new publicly owned treatment works to seventy-ªve percent.86 Farmers 
remained largely exempt from the statute.87
1. Principal Aspects of the Legislation 
 Substantively, the 1972 Amendments changed the regulatory ap-
proach of federal water pollution controls. Although the 1972 legisla-
tion continued and expanded the water quality standards required by 
the Water Quality Act of 1965,88 the focus of the new statute shifted to 
nationally applicable, feasibility-based standards that were uniform 
among categories of point sources.89 Industrial polluters accepted the 
new approach of uniform standards because it qualiªed the absolute 
prohibition of the Refuse Act and reduced the prospect that in-
creased pollution costs would place some polluters at a competitive 
disadvantage. In establishing these feasibility-based standards, the 
statute distinguished between existing and new sources and between 
publicly owned treatment works and all other point sources. 
 For existing point sources, Congress established a two-step pro-
gression of standards. By 1977, publicly owned treatment works had to 
provide secondary treatment before discharging their efºuent into 
the navigable waters;90 by 1983, publicly owned treatment works had 
to employ the best treatment control technology over the life of the 
                                                                                                                      
(codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)) (deªning “pollutant” to include “municipal . . . waste 
discharged into water”). 
86 Id. § 202, 86 Stat. at 834–35 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1282). 
87 See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra notes 115–41 and accompanying text. 
89 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, §§ 301(b), 304, 
86 Stat. at 844, 850 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314 (1976)). 
EPA’s authority to issue binding efºuent standards for categories of existing sources rather 
than to establish guidelines that would be used to establish individualized standards in 
permit proceedings remained uncertain until the Supreme Court’s decision in E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). If a point source does not fall into a cate-
gory of sources for which EPA has established feasibility-based standards, the agency (or 
the state in cases where the state has an approved discharge permitting program) must still 
establish the standards sufªcient to satisfy the substantive standards of the Act when it is-
sues a permit to the point source. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, sec. 2, § 402(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A), 86 Stat. at 880–81 (codiªed as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A) (2000)); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.3d 759, 762 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1992); NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378–79 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
90 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, §§ 301(b)(1)(B), 
304(b), (d)(1), 86 Stat. at 845, 851, 852 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(b), (d)(1) (1976)). The current version of the EPA regulation 
deªning secondary treatment is at 40 C.F.R. § 133.100–.105 (2004). 
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works.91 Other point sources (principally industrial discharges) were 
to employ the best practicable control technology currently available 
(BPT) by 197792 and the best available control technology economi-
cally achievable (BAT) by 1983.93 The principal difference between 
the two standards involved the role of costs. In setting BPT standards, 
EPA was to consider “the total cost of application of technology in re-
lation to the efºuent reduction beneªts to be achieved from such ap-
plication.”94 For BAT standards, the “cost of achieving such efºuent 
reduction” was merely one item in a list of factors EPA was directed to 
consider.95
                                                                                                                      
91 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 301(b)(2)(B), 
86 Stat. at 845 (codiªed prior to repeal at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(B) (1976)), repealed by 
Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 
97-117, sec. 21(b), 95 Stat. 1623, 1632. Section 301(b)(2)(B) did not establish this stan-
dard directly. Instead, it required that—by 1983—existing plants had to achieve the stan-
dard that new plants had to satisfy to receive federal grants. See infra note 110 and accom-
panying text. 
92  Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, §§ 301(b), 
304(b)(1), 86 Stat. at 844, 851 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 
1314(b)(1) (1976)). 
93 Id. §§ 301(b)(2)(A), 304(b)(2), 86 Stat. at 844, 851 (codiªed as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2) (2000)). 
94  Id. § 304(b)(1), 86 Stat. at 851 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1314(b)(1) (1976)). Senator Muskie, the chairman of the Senate Environment Commit-
tee, provided the following description of the BPT standard in a document inserted in the 
Congressional Record during the Senate debate on the 1972 Amendments: 
 The Administrator should establish the range of “best practicable” levels 
based on the average of the best existing performance by plants of various 
sizes, ages, and unit processes within each industrial category. In those indus-
trial categories where present practices are uniformly inadequate, the Admin-
istrator should interpret “best practicable” to require higher levels of control 
than any currently in place if he determines that the technology to achieve 
those higher levels can be practicably applied. 
 “Best practicable” can be interpreted as the equivalent of secondary 
treatment for industry, but this interpretation should not be construed to 
limit the authority of the Administrator. 
118 Cong. Rec. 33,696 (1972). For judicial acceptance of this deªnition, see Am. Paper 
Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 341–42 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Am. Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 
453 (7th Cir. 1975). 
95 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 304(b)(2)(B), 
86 Stat. at 851 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1976)). Sena-
tor Muskie offered this explanation of the BAT standard: 
 In determining the degree of efºuent reduction to be achieved for a cate-
gory of class of sources by 1983, the Administrator may consider a broader 
range of technological alternatives and should, at a minimum, review capa-
bilities, which exist in operation or which can be applied as a result of public 
and private research efforts. 
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 When prescribing standards for new sources, the 1972 statute 
continued to distinguish between publicly owned treatment works 
and other point sources. New sources other than publicly owned 
treatment works96 were to use the best available demonstrated control 
technology (BADT).97 For publicly owned treatment works, the new 
standard was indirect. Because Congress anticipated that new public 
treatment facilities would be funded through the federal grant pro-
gram, the conditions for grant approval contained the substantive 
standard. EPA could fund a construction project only if the project 
provided for “the best practicable waste treatment technology over 
the life of the works.”98
 In addition to establishing substantive standards, the new statute 
created a new permit program administered by EPA.99 The permit 
                                                                                                                      
 . . . [R]ather than establishing the range of levels in reference to the av-
erage of the best performers in an industrial category, the range should, at a 
minimum, be established with reference to the best performers in an indus-
trial category. 
118 Cong. Rec. 33,696 (1972); see Am. Meat Inst., 526 F.2d at 462–63. Congress later added 
a limited exception that allowed EPA to set a lesser standard when the lesser standard rep-
resented the “maximum degree of control within the economic capability of the owner 
and operator of the source . . . .” Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 
sec. 308(e)(1), § 302(b), 101 Stat. 7, 39 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(B)(i) 
(2000)). 
96 A source is subject to a new source standard of performance if “construction” of the 
source “commenced after the publication of proposed regulations” prescribing the standard. 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 306(a)(2), 86 Stat. at 
855 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2) (2000)) (emphasis added). A source that is con-
structed in accordance with all applicable standards of performance is not “subject to any 
more stringent standard of performance” for 10 years. Id. § 306(d), 86 Stat. at 856 
(codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1316(d)); see NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (10-
year protection extends to BAT standards as well as to new source standards of perform-
ance). 
97 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 306(a)(1), 86 
Stat. at 854 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1)). 
98 Id. § 201(g)(2)(A), 86 Stat. 816, 834 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1281(g)(2)(A) (1976)). In the 1987 Amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress 
phased out the construction grants in favor of a loan program. See infra notes 277–79 and 
accompanying text. 
In establishing the “best practicable treatment over the life of the work” standard, EPA 
was to insure that the works “will take into account and allow to the extent practicable the 
application of technology at a later date which will provide for the reclaiming or recycling 
of water or otherwise eliminate the discharge of pollutants.” Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 201(g)(2)(B), 86 Stat. at 834 (codiªed prior to 
amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(2)(B) (1976)). 
99 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 402, 86 Stat. at 
880 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000)). A recent dispute involving the 
aerial spraying of pesticides is illustrative. Compare League of Wilderness Defenders v. Fors-
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program applied to “the discharge of any pollutant”100 from a “point 
source”101 into “navigable waters.”102 Once a permit was issued, the 
permit deªned the discharger’s obligation under the Act. Compliance 
with the permit was “deemed” compliance with the Act.103
 Section 502 expanded the deªnition of the term “navigable wa-
ters” beyond the traditional requirement that a water be navigable in its 
                                                                                                                      
gren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (permit required for aerial spraying of forest that 
would place pesticides in waters covered by the Clean Water Act), with Interim Statement 
and Guidance on Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance 
with FIFRA, 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Aug. 13, 2003) (proposed guidance document from EPA 
indicating that no permit is required for aerial spraying designed to control pests in or 
over the navigable waters). 
100  Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, §§ 301(a), 
402(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 86 Stat. at 844, 880 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 
1342(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)); see id. § 502(12), 86 Stat. at 886 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(12)) (“The term ‘discharge of a pollutant ‘ and the term ‘discharge of pollutants ‘ 
each means . . . any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source”) 
(emphasis added); see also id. § 502(16), 86 Stat. at 887 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16)) 
(“The term ‘discharge’ when used without qualiªcation includes a discharge of a pollut-
ant, and a discharge of pollutants.”); id. § 502(6), 86 Stat. at 886 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(6)) (“The term ‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, 
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioac-
tive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and indus-
trial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.”); N. Plains Res. Council v. 
Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir.) (groundwater produced in 
association with methane gas extraction and discharged into a river is a pollutant under 
the Clean Water Act), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003). But see Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest 
Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (implying an exception from the deªnition of 
pollutants for nuclear waste regulated by the Atomic Energy Act); Ass’n to Protect Ham-
mersley, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(mussel shells and other biological materials released by mussels growing on harvesting 
rafts are not pollutants under the Clean Water Act). 
101 Section 402(a)(1) authorizes the EPA Administrator to “issue a permit for the dis-
charge of any pollutant,” and section 502(12) deªnes “discharge of a pollutant” to mean 
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source” as well as “any 
addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point 
source other than a vessel or other ºoating craft.” Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, §§ 402(a)(1), 502(12), 86 Stat. at 880, 886 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), 1362(12)) (emphases added). See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Micco-
sukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 112 (2004) (pumping water from one body of water 
into another requires a permit); Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(shell shot from ship into coastal waters is discharge of a pollutant into the navigable wa-
ters from a point source), rev’d on other grounds, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). But see Ass’n to Protect 
Hammersley, Eld, & Totten Inlets, 299 F.3d at 1019 (harvesting rafts on which mussels were 
grown were not point sources); United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 
(2d Cir. 1993) (human being who threw waste into a river was not a point source). 
102 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 502(7), 86 
Stat. at 886 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)) (“The term ‘navigable waters’ 
means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”). 
103 Id. § 402(k), 86 Stat. at 883 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k)). 
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natural state or by reasonable improvements.104 In the 1972 Amend-
ments, Congress deªned “navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the 
United States, including the territorial seas.”105 The Senate conference 
report declared that this language was to be “given the broadest possi-
ble constitutional interpretation.”106
 A discharger could avoid the permit requirement by sending its 
waste water to a publicly owned treatment works, but the 1972 statute 
directed EPA to promulgate “pretreatment” standards for that situa-
tion.107 The goal of these pretreatment standards was to prevent a dis-
charger from sending to a publicly owned treatment works any pollut-
ant that “interferes with, passes through, or otherwise is incompatible 
with such works.”108
 As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the 1972 legislation 
imposed regulatory controls on discharges from publicly owned 
treatment works as well as discharges from industrial point sources. To 
make the new requirements palatable to local governments, Congress 
authorized a new construction grant program in which the federal 
share of the cost of building new treatment facilities was seventy-ªve 
percent.109 To qualify for the federal funding, states and local gov-
                                                                                                                      
104 See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
105 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 502(7), 86 
Stat. at 886 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)). 
106 S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822; 
see, e.g., Soper, supra note 1, at 26 n.30; Zener, supra note 70, at 687–92. But see Solid Waste 
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001) (rejecting a construction of 
the statute by the corps that would reach isolated wetlands with no hydrological connec-
tion to navigable surface waters, in part because doing so would raise signiªcant federalism 
questions). See generally William Funk, The Court, The Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: 
SWANCC and Beyond, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,741 ( July 2001); David E. Kunz, 
A River Runs Through It: An Analysis of the Implications of Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers on the Clean Water Act and Federal 
Environmental Law, 9 Envtl. Law. 463, 463–66, 468–70 (2003). 
107 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 502(7), 86 
Stat. at 886 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)). 
108 Id. § 307(b), 86 Stat. at 857 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)). EPA 
also had to promulgate similar restrictions for new sources that discharged into publicly 
owned treatment works. Id. § 307(c), 86 Stat. at 858 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(c)). 
109 Id. § 201(g), 86 Stat. at 834 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g) 
(1976)). See generally Clinton W. Shinn, The Federal Grant Program to Aid Construction of Mu-
nicipal Sewage Treatment Plants: A Survey of the 1972 FWPCA Amendments, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 85, 
86 (1973). 
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ernments had to establish an area-wide policy for handling sewer-
age.110
 For the most part, the new regulatory controls did not affect 
farmers.111 The limitation of the reach of the statute’s regulatory pro-
visions to discharges from point sources 112  exempted runoff from 
farming operations.113 Congress did, however, speciªcally include one 
agricultural activity—concentrated animal feeding operations—within 
the deªnition of point source.114
 The 1972 Amendments did not entirely abandon the water quality 
approach of the 1965 legislation. They established an “interim” na-
tional goal of achieving ªshable and swimmable water quality by July 1, 
1983; more precisely, the goal was to achieve water quality that would 
allow the propagation of ªsh and wildlife, and recreational uses of wa-
ter, by that date “wherever attainable.”115 To help reach that goal, the 
1972 Amendments contained three sections, sections 101, 302, and 303, 
that focused on water quality; in addition, section 301(a) required 
point sources to comply with efºuent limits set under these sections as 
well as with the feasibility-based standards described above.116 Nonethe-
less, achievement of efºuent standards based on water quality was a dis-
tinctly subordinate concern of the new legislation. 
 Section 302117 provided a mechanism for enforcing the “interim 
goal” of achieving ªshable and swimmable waters. 118  It authorized 
EPA to set a stricter efºuent control whenever feasibility-based stan-
                                                                                                                      
110 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 208(d), 86 
Stat. at 842 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1288(d) (2000)). 
111 For a general analysis of the farming exemptions in a variety of environmental stat-
utes, see J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Laws, 27 Ecology 
L.Q. 263 (2000). 
112 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
113 EPA originally exempted irrigation return ºows from the permit requirement of 
section 402 even though they fell within the statutory deªnition of a point source. Form 
and Guidelines Regarding Agricultural and Silvicultural Activities, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,000, 
18,000 ( July 5, 1973). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit over-
turned this exemption in NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1977), but 
then Congress excluded irrigation return ºows from the deªnition of point source in 1977. 
Congress further excluded agricultural stormwater discharges from the deªnition in 1987. 
See infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
114 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 502(14), 86 
Stat. at 887 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)). 
115 Id. § 101(a)(2), 86 Stat. at 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)). 
116 Id. § 301(a), 86 Stat. at 844 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). 
117 Id. § 302, 86 Stat. at 846 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1312). 
118 Id. § 101(a)(2), 86 Stat. at 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)). 
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dards were insufªcient to achieve the water quality goal.119 EPA was to 
establish this stricter standard by publishing a notice of the proposed 
limitation and then holding a public hearing.120 However, if the ap-
plicant demonstrated the absence of any “reasonable relationship be-
tween the economic and social costs and the beneªts to be obtained” 
from achieving the limitation under section 302, the limitation did 
not “become effective.”121
 Section 101 declared a “national policy that the discharge of 
toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited,”122 and section 307 
provided for extra controls on toxic pollutants.123 Speciªcally, section 
307 obligated the Administrator to identify toxic pollutants for which 
additional efºuent limits were appropriate and to prepare supple-
mental standards for those pollutants. 
 The 1972 Amendments broadly deªned the term “toxic pollut-
ant,”124 but section 307 did not require additional efºuent standards 
for all pollutants covered by the deªnition. 125  Instead, the section 
gave EPA ninety days to prepare a list of pollutants for which addi-
tional controls were to be established.126 In deciding whether to in-
clude a pollutant on the list, EPA was to “take into account” the fol-
lowing factors: “the toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, 
degradability, the usual or potential presence of the affected organ-
isms in any waters, the importance of the affected organisms and the 
nature and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organ-
isms.”127 If a pollutant was included on the list, EPA had a duty to pre-
                                                                                                                      
119 Id. § 101, 86 Stat. at 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251). 
120 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 302(b)(1), 86 
Stat. at 846 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(1)). 
121 Id. § 302(b)(2), 86 Stat. at 846 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A)). 
122 Id. § 101(a)(3), 86 Stat. at 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3)). 
123  Id. § 307, 86 Stat. at 856 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1317 
(1976)). 
124  See id. § 502(13), 86 Stat. at 886 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (2000)) 
(deªning “toxic pollutant” to mean a pollutant or “combination of pollutants” that, “after 
discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or assimilation into any organism, 
either directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will, 
on the basis of information available to the Administrator, cause death, disease, behavioral 
abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions” or “physical defor-
mations, in such organisms or their offspring.”). 
125 See id. § 307, 86 Stat. at 856 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1317 
(1976)). 
126 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 307, 86 
Stat. at 856 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976)). 
127  Id. § 307(a)(1), 86 Stat. at 856 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(a)(1) (1976)). 
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pare an efºuent standard for the pollutant “at that level which the 
Administrator determines provides an ample margin of safety.”128 Af-
ter the efºuent standard was established for a toxic pollutant, the 
Administrator had to “designate the category or categories of sources 
to which the efºuent standard” applies.129 Once EPA established a 
toxic pollutant standard, all point sources to which the standard ap-
plied had to comply with the standard within one year.130
 Section 303131 obligated states to set and implement water quality 
standards by continuing and expanding the 1965 provisions for state 
water quality standards.132 It extended the obligation for state water 
quality standards to encompass intrastate waters,133 and it required 
states to review their existing standards and to conduct an additional 
review of the standards every three years. 134  The amended statute 
gave the EPA Administrator authority to establish standards when a 
state failed to comply with the statutory mandate,135 and it required 
the Administrator to identify those pollutants that were “suitable for 
maximum daily load measurement correlated with the achievement 
of water quality objectives.”136 The statute also obligated states to iden-
tify waters that failed to meet water quality standards as well as those 
waters for which controls on thermal discharges were “not stringent 
enough to assure protection and propagation of a balanced indige-
nous population of shellªsh, ªsh, and wildlife.”137 Once the waters 
that failed to meet the Act’s standards were identiªed, states had to 
                                                                                                                      
128  Id. § 307(a)(4), 86 Stat. at 857 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(a)(4) (1976)). 
129  Id. § 307(a)(5), 86 Stat. at 857 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(a)(5) (1976)). 
130  Id. § 307(a)(6), 86 Stat. at 857 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(a)(6) (1976)). 
131 Id. § 303, 86 Stat. at 846 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000)). 
132 See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under 
the Clean Water Act, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1168, 1177–81 (1983); Zener, supra note 70, at 
719–23. Once a state water quality standard is established, the permit program provides 
the mechanism for enforcing the requirement against point sources. Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, §§ 301(b)(1)(C), 402(b)(1)(A), 86 Stat. at 
845, 881 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1342(b)(1)(A) 
(1976)). 
133 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 303(a)(2)–
(3), 86 Stat. at 847 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(2)–(3) (2000)). 
134 Id. § 303(c), 86 Stat. at 847 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)). 
135 Id. § 303(a)(1)–(3), (b), 86 Stat. at 846–47 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(a)(1)–(3)(C), (b)). 
136 Id. § 304(a)(2)(D), 86 Stat. at 850 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2)(D)). 
137 Id. § 303(d)(1)(A)–(B), 86 Stat. at 848 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A)–
(B)). 
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develop total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for those waters for any 
pollutant that the Administrator determined was suitable for the cal-
culation of such a load, and to develop total maximum daily thermal 
loads for the waters where controls on thermal discharges were in-
adequate to protect ªsh and wildlife.138 The states had to submit the 
identiªcations and the TMDLs to EPA for approval.139 If EPA disap-
proved a state’s submission, the agency had to prepare the 
identiªcations or the TMDLs itself.140 The statute did not expressly 
provide what action EPA should take if a state made no submission.141
 The efºuent standards and permit requirements of the 1972 
amendments applied only to point sources. For nonpoint sources of 
pollution, the 1972 Act substituted planning for regulation. As a pre-
requisite to obtaining construction grants for publicly owned treat-
ment works, section 208142 obligated states to initiate “a continuing 
area-wide waste treatment management planning process” for areas 
with “substantial water quality control problems.”143 In the planning 
process, the states had to provide for the creation of a plan for con-
trolling pollution from both point sources and nonpoint sources.144 
Plans prepared pursuant to this process had to be submitted to EPA 
for approval, but the Act did not authorize EPA to prepare a federal 
plan even if the plan submitted by the state was inadequate.145 Al-
though Congress authorized funding for the planning process, it did 
                                                                                                                      
138 Id. § 303(d)(1)(C)–(D), 86 Stat. at 848–49 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C)–
(D)). 
139 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 303(d)(2), 86 
Stat. at 849 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2)). The ªrst submission was to be due 180 
days after the Administrator identiªed the pollutants that were suitable for calculation of 
total maximum daily loads. See id.; see also id. § 304(a)(2)(D), 86 Stat. at 850–51 (codiªed 
at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2)(D)). 
140 Id. § 303(d)(2), 86 Stat. at 849 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2)). 
141 See id. Theoretically, a state could lose its authority to administer the permit pro-
grams under sections 402 and 404 if the state failed to implement total maximum daily 
loads once they were prepared. Id. A state’s “continuing planning process” under section 
303 must include total maximum daily loads. Id. § 303(e), 86 Stat. at 849 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1313(e)). Moreover, the statute forbids EPA from approving any state permit 
program in a state that “does not have an approved continuing planning process.” Id. 
142  Id. § 208, 86 Stat. at 839 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1288 
(1976)). 
143 Id. § 208(a)–(b), (g), 86 Stat. at 839–42, 843 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 
U.S. C. § 1288(a)–(b), (g) (1976)); see Zener, supra note 70, at 765–70. 
144 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 208(b), 86 
Stat. at 840 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b) (1976)). 
145 See id. 
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not require that the state plans impose regulatory limits nor did it of-
fer to pay the cost of reducing pollution from nonpoint sources. 
 The 1972 Act continued the traditional authority of the Corps of 
Engineers to protect navigation. The Act gave EPA control over pollu-
tion discharges,146 but it prohibited the issuance of any permit when 
the corps concluded that the discharge would impair anchorage or 
navigation. In addition, the statute established a separate permit pro-
gram under which the corps controlled the deposit of dredge and ªll 
materials into the waters of the United States.147
 Section 402 allowed the corps to veto any pollution discharge 
permit that would impair navigation.148 The mechanism for exercis-
ing this authority was, however, less than straightforward. To obtain 
approval to administer the pollution discharge permit program under 
section 402, a state had to demonstrate that no permit would be is-
sued if the Chief of Engineers—after consultation with the Coast 
Guard—concluded that “anchorage and navigation of any of the 
navigable waters would be substantially impaired thereby.”149 When 
the Administrator issued a permit under section 402, the federal 
permit program was “subject to the same terms, conditions, and re-
quirements as apply to a State permit program.”150
 More importantly, section 404 substituted for the prohibition of 
the Refuse Act a provision that allowed the Corps of Engineers to is-
sue permits “for the discharge of dredged or ªll material into the 
navigable waters at speciªed disposal sites.”151 Just as section 402 pre-
                                                                                                                      
146 Id. § 402, 86 Stat. at 880 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000)). 
147 Id. § 404, 86 Stat. at 884 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344). EPA and the 
Corps of Engineers have adopted identical regulations deªning “ªll material” as 
material placed in the waters of the United States where the material has the 
effect of: 
 (i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or 
 (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United 
States. 
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2004); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2004). For examples of the controversies 
that arose before the agencies adopted the common deªnition in 2002, see Kentuckians 
for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003); Res. Invs., Inc. v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 151 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1998); Final Revisions to the Clean 
Water Act Regulatory Deªnitions of “Fill Material” and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 67 Fed. 
Reg. 31,129, 31,130–32 (May 9, 2002) (preamble to joint rule). 
148 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 402(b)(6), 86 
Stat. at 881 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(6)). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. § 402(a)(3), 86 Stat. at 880 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3)). 
151 Id. § 404(a), 86 Stat. at 884 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)). 
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served the control of the corps over the impact of pollution dis-
charges on navigability,152 section 404 attempted to grant EPA control 
over the pollution impacts of deposits of dredge and ªll material.153 
In deciding whether to grant a permit, the corps was to consider water 
quality criteria that EPA established for ocean dumping plus the eco-
nomic impact of the proposed disposal site on anchorage and naviga-
tion.154 Moreover, the statute gave EPA power to veto any particular 
disposal site that would “have an unacceptable adverse effect on mu-
nicipal water supplies, shellªsh beds and ªshery areas . . . , wildlife, 
or recreational areas.”155
 Attempting to correct one of the most serious deªciencies of 
prior legislation,156 Congress also established new enforcement provi-
sions in 1972.157 The federal statute now authorized the federal gov-
ernment to sue in federal court to collect civil penalties from viola-
tors, and it included criminal provisions for intentional violations.158 
A still greater innovation allowed private parties to ªle civil actions 
against persons who violated the federal statute and even against the 
EPA Administrator when the Administrator failed to perform a non-
discretionary duty.159 Before ªling such a “citizen suit,” the plaintiff 
had to provide sixty days’ notice to the defendant and—in the case of 
suits against violators—to EPA and to the state in which the violation 
occurred.160
 In the 1972 Amendments, the federal government assumed a 
dominant role in water pollution control without totally displacing state 
authority.161 The declaration of goals and policy in the statute contin-
ued “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,”162 and 
the states indeed did retain important powers under the 1972 Amend-
                                                                                                                      
152 See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
153 The section 404 process was similar to the one that the corps had established in 
1971 to issue permits under the Refuse Act. See Andreen, supra note 7, at 259. 
154 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 404(b), 86 
Stat. at 884 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)). 
155 Id. § 404(c), 86 Stat. at 884 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c)). 
156 See generally Barry, supra note 17. 
157 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 309(b)–(d), 
86 Stat. at 860 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. §1319(b)–(d)). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. § 505, 86 Stat. at 888 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. § 101(b), 86 Stat. at 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)). 
162 Id. 
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ments.163 States could continue their own water pollution control regu-
lations as long as they were at least as stringent as federal requirements, 
and they could assume responsibility for administering the permit sys-
tem under section 402. Furthermore, the 1972 Amendments also gave 
states new authority over federal decisions that polluted waterways.164
 Like most federal environmental statutes, 165  the 1972 Amend-
ments established a system of ºoor preemption and preserved state 
authority to impose standards stricter than the requirements of the 
federal statute.166 Section 510 expressly preserved the power of states, 
local governments, and interstate agencies to adopt water pollution 
control regulations so long as they were no “less stringent” than the 
requirements established pursuant to federal law.167
 Perhaps the most substantial role for states under the 1972 
Amendments involved the permit program for discharges from point 
sources.168 A state that obtained approval from EPA could assume re-
sponsibility for administering the discharge permit program. 169  To 
obtain EPA approval, the state had to demonstrate that its program 
would satisfy the substantive and procedural requirements of the fed-
eral statute.170
 Two sections expanded state authority to control polluting activi-
ties authorized by the federal government. Section 313 required 
agencies of the federal government to comply with “all . . . State, in-
terstate, and local requirements respecting the control and abatement 
of water pollution to the same extent as any nongovernmental en-
tity.”171  Section 401 precluded any federal agency from granting a 
permit for any activity that might result in the discharge of a pollutant 
into the waters of the United States unless the applicant obtained 
                                                                                                                      
163 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 510, 86 Stat. at 
893 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1370). 
164 Id. 
165 See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 505, 30 U.S.C. 
§ 1255 (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 § 1413, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a) (2000); 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2000); Clean 
Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2000). 
166 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 510, 86 Stat. at 
893 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1370). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. § 402(b), 86 Stat. at 880 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. §§ 313, 401(a)(1), 86 Stat. at 875, 877 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1323, 1341(a)(1)). 
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from the state a certiªcation “that any such discharge will comply with 
the applicable” substantive requirements of the 1972 law.172
2. Administration of the Act: Lackluster Implementation by EPA, the 
Corps of Engineers, and the States 
 The 1972 Amendments were overly ambitious in the tasks they 
assigned to EPA. Congress never gave the agency resources commen-
surate with its new responsibilities,173 and frequent legal challenges 
also delayed implementation.174 Moreover, achieving the BAT stan-
dards—the second stage of feasibility-based controls for industrial 
sources—proved to be very costly and to result in much more modest 
reductions in pollution than the BPT standards had produced.175
 Progress was even slower with respect to standards based on water 
quality. Section 302 proved to be a dead letter.176 EPA also failed to 
meet the statutory deadline for identifying toxic pollutants for which 
section 307 standards were to be prepared,177 and the agency delayed 
the process for preparing TMDLs under section 303 by its failure to 
identify those pollutants for which the calculation of TMDLs was ap-
propriate.178
 For several reasons, EPA never used its section 302 authority. Set-
ting a section 302 standard was likely to involve an awkward proce-
dure; the efºuent limits established pursuant to the section were sub-
ject to important exceptions; and the section provided no means for 
reaching nonpoint sources. 
 The procedure apparently envisioned by section 302179 would be 
awkward in the typical case where numerous point sources contrib-
uted to the pollution of a water body. Before establishing “any 
efºuent limitation” under section 302, the Administrator had to pub-
                                                                                                                      
172 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 401, 86 Stat. at 
877 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1341). 
173 See generally Richard N.L. Andrews, Environment and Energy: Implications of Overloaded 
Agendas, 19 Nat. Resources 487 (1979). 
174 See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bay Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977). 
175 See Peter S. Menell & Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Law and Policy 
479–88 (1994). 
176 See infra notes 179–84 and accompanying text. 
177 See infra notes 185–93 and accompanying text. 
178 See infra notes 194–98 and accompanying text. 
179 See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, 
§ 302(b)(1), 86 Stat. at 846 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(1)). 
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lish a proposed limitation and to hold a public hearing.180 Of course, 
modiªcation of a proposed efºuent limitation for one point source 
might require changes in the standards applicable to other point 
sources if the water quality standard were to be achieved. Thus, EPA 
presumably would have to set the limits for all point sources contrib-
uting to the pollution in the water body in simultaneous but separate 
proceedings. 
 Section 302 also provided an important exception to its provision 
for stricter substantive standards.181 With the concurrence of the state, 
the Administrator could modify the new controls whenever the cost of 
attaining the water quality standard was unreasonable.182 Because the 
reasonableness of the cost already had been considered in setting the 
feasibility-based standards,183 this language almost always was likely to 
permit an exception to the section 302 standards. 
 Perhaps most signiªcantly, section 302—like the other regulatory 
limits of the 1972 Amendments—applied only to point sources. 184  
Thus, the section did not provide a very useful alternative in the typi-
cal case where pollution from nonpoint sources was a signiªcant fac-
tor in the failure to meet the ªshable and swimmable goal. 
 The agency also found it impossible to comply with the obliga-
tion to issue toxic pollutant standards until a 1976 consent decree al-
lowed it to issue feasibility-based standards rather than standards de-
signed to protect the aquatic environment. 185  As noted above, 186  
                                                                                                                      
180 See id. 
181 Id. § 302(b)(2), 86 Stat. at 846 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)). 
182 Id. 
183 See id. § 302(b), 86 Stat. at 846 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)). 
184 Id. § 301(b)(1)(A), 86 Stat. at 845 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)). 
185 See generally Khristine L. Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 609, 616 (1978); Ridgway M. Hall, 
Jr., The Evolution and Implementation of EPA’s Regulatory Program to Control the Discharge of Toxic 
Pollutants to the Nation’s Waters, 10 Nat. Resources Law. 507, 519, 525 (1977); Oliver A. 
Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 10,528, 10,534–36 (1991); Rosemary O’Leary, The Courts and the EPA: The Amazing 
“Flannery Decision”, 5 Nat. Resources & Env’t 18 (1990). 
An additional complication was the decision by EPA to use formal, trial-type hearings 
in setting the toxic pollutant standards. See Khristine Hall, supra, at 615. The statutory ob-
ligation to use these procedures was ambiguous. Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 307, 86 Stat. at 856 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 
U.S.C. § 1317 (1976)). Section 307 originally required the Administrator to issue a notice 
of a “public hearing” after publishing a proposed standard. Following the public hearing, 
the Administrator was to promulgate the standard unless the Administrator found, “on the 
record, that a modiªcation . . . [was] justiªed based upon a preponderance of the evi-
dence adduced at such hearings.” Id. The Administrative Procedure Act requires trial-type 
hearings whenever a statute mandates that rules “be made on the record after opportunity 
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Congress had given EPA ninety days to prepare an initial list of toxic 
pollutants subject to section 307. When EPA failed to meet that goal, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) brought a citizen suit 
seeking to force EPA to promulgate the list.187 Pursuant to a settle-
ment in that case, EPA ªled a list containing only nine toxic pollut-
ants.188 Dissatisªed with both the list and the criteria used to prepare 
the list, NRDC ªled another law suit.189 The district court upheld the 
EPA decision, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reversed the trial court on procedural grounds. 190  As the 
NRDC litigation was proceeding, various other environmental groups 
ªled additional suits challenging EPA’s failure to prepare section 307 
standards for the nine toxic pollutants the agency had identiªed.191 
Eventually, EPA agreed to a second settlement to resolve all the pend-
ing litigation.192 This settlement obligated EPA to issue new standards 
for sixty-ªve “priority” pollutants. For those pollutants, EPA had to 
establish standards for twenty-one categories of industrial polluters, 
but the settlement allowed the agency to base the standards on the 
best available technology for each category. In addition, EPA agreed 
to prepare additional standards designed to protect the aquatic envi-
ronment from six highly toxic pollutants.193
 EPA made even slower progress with respect to section 303. The 
agency initially failed to identify the pollutants for which TMDLs were 
to be prepared. Once the pollutants were identiªed, the agency al-
lowed states to satisfy their section 303 obligations with minimal sub-
missions. 
 The prerequisite for state preparation of TMDLs was identiª-
cation of pollutants for which the calculation of TMDLs was appropri-
ate. The 1972 Amendments required EPA to identify those pollutants 
                                                                                                                      
for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000). The 1977 Amendments made it clear 
that trial-type hearings were not required for future regulations. See Clean Water Act of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec. 53, § 307(a)(2), 91 Stat. 1566, 1589–90 (codiªed as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (2000)). 
186 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
187 NRDC v. Fri, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,587 (D.D.C. 1973). 
188 List of Toxic Pollutants, 38 Fed. Reg. 24,342, 24,343 (Sept. 7, 1973). 
189 NRDC v. Train, 6 E.R.C. 1702, 1703 (D.D.C. 1974), rev’d, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
190 Id. 
191 See Ridgway Hall, supra note 185, at 515. 
192 NRDC v. Train, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,588 (D.D.C. 1976) (settlement 
order). 
193 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 129.1, 129.4 (2004); Houck, supra note 185, at 10,534–35. 
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within a year,194 but the agency failed to meet that deadline. As with 
the list of section 307 toxic pollutants, a citizen suit ªnally forced EPA 
to identify the pollutants for which TMDLs were appropriate.195 Fol-
lowing a settlement in that suit, EPA promulgated the list of pollutants 
in 1978.196
 Identiªcation of the pollutants for which TMDLs were appropri-
ate initiated the process by which states were to identify waters that 
failed to meet water quality standards for those pollutants and to pre-
pare TMDLs for those waters.197 The process, however, produced few 
tangible results. States lacked data that would enable them to prepare 
comprehensive lists of waters that failed to meet water quality stan-
dards. Even when impaired waters were identiªed, states submitted 
almost no TMDLs, and EPA did virtually nothing to prod the states to 
action.198
 Implementation of section 404 was particularly controversial. The 
Corps of Engineers initially deªned the scope of its new regulatory 
authority narrowly. 199  Environmentalists obtained a court decision 
rejecting that deªnition, but the corps has rarely denied permits to 
developers who need dredge and ªll permits.200
 Despite the deªnition of navigable waters as “waters of the 
United States” in the 1972 Amendments,201 the Corps of Engineers 
applied the traditional deªnition in deciding when permits were re-
quired and so declined to require permits for deposits of dredge and 
                                                                                                                      
194 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
sec. 2, § 307(a)(6), 86 Stat. 816, 857 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(a)(6) (1976)). 
195 Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Costle, No. 78-0572 (D.D.C. June 20, 1978) (order com-
pelling EPA not to delay its identiªcation of pollutants). 
196 Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,662, 60,663 
(Dec. 28, 1978). 
197 See supra notes 131–41 and accompanying text. 
198 See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program: Law, Pol-
icy, and Implementation 50–51 (2d ed. 2002); Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths that 
Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 63, 63–64 (2002); James R. May, The 
Rise and Repose of Assimilation-Based Water Quality, Part I: TMDL Litigation, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,247, 10,247 (2004). 
199 See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 
12,118–20 (Apr. 3, 1974). 
200 NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
201 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
sec. 2, § 502(7), 86 Stat. 816, 886 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000)); 
see supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
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ªll material into wetlands.202 The District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia overturned this interpretation,203 after which revised regula-
tions extended the permit requirement to most wetlands.204 More re-
cent litigation has, however, sustained the revised regulations only in 
part. In 1985, the Supreme Court upheld the new requirement inso-
far as it applied to wetlands adjacent to surface waters,205 but a 2001 
decision held that “isolated wetlands” are not part of the navigable 
waters under the federal statute.206 In addition, lower court decisions 
have ruled that the regulation does not reach some activities that can 
eliminate the characteristics that cause an area to be classiªed as a 
wetland.207
 As noted above, section 404 established a complicated process for 
issuing permits for the deposit of dredge and ªll materials. The proc-
ess gave EPA theoretical control over the process by allowing the 
agency to establish the guidelines for issuing permits and to veto 
permits with unacceptable adverse effects on the environment. Not-
withstanding these powers of EPA, the Corps of Engineers controlled 
the program as a practical matter.208 The corps was responsible for 
making the permit decision. In making the decision, the corps could 
consider economic matters as well as EPA guidelines. Moreover, EPA 
funding and stafªng insufªciencies ensured that EPA would exercise 
its veto authority infrequently.209 As a result, the corps approved al-
                                                                                                                      
202 See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 
12,118–20 (Apr. 3, 1974). 
203 Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686. 
204 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 
31,320–21 ( July 25, 1975). 
205 United States v. Riverside Bay Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985). 
206 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168–71 (2001). 
207 See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (incidental fallback that accompanies dredging does not require a permit under 
section 404). But see Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 815 
(9th Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (“deep ripping” of wet-
lands constitutes the deposit of dredge and ªll material under section 404); Timothy S. 
Bishop et al., Counting the Hands on Borden Ranch, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,040 
(2004); Robin Kundis Craig, “No Comment” on Deep Ripping: Wetlands and the Clean Water Act 
After Borden Ranch, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,028 (2004). 
208 For a recent example of the signiªcance of granting control of the program to the 
Corps of Engineers, see Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 
445 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that under section 404, the corps can issue permits allowing 
excess overburden from coal mining to be placed into valley ªlls). 
209 See Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 773, 790 (1989) (“Of an 
estimated 160,000 permits issued from the enactment of the program to January 1, 1989, 
EPA exercised its [veto] authority a total of eight times.”). 
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most all of the applications that it received seeking permits to deposit 
dredge and ªll material into wetlands. 
 Section 208 was perhaps the least successful of the innovations in 
the 1972 Amendments. The lack of success was most notable with re-
spect to pollution from nonpoint sources. EPA lacked authority to 
force states to establish controls on nonpoint sources, and states 
lacked the political will to enact controls without a federal mandate. 
One commentary termed the section 208 program “a toothless system 
of incentives and planning.”210 A leading casebook concluded that the 
program was doomed to failure because Congress was unwilling to 
mandate “new local land use control and agricultural practice stan-
dards” in 1972.211
 The 1972 statute only partially succeeded in the goal of preserv-
ing “the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-
duce, and eliminate pollution.”212 States rarely exercised their author-
ity to set more stringent standards except when they were trying to 
apply those standards to dischargers in other states. 213  States did 
gradually assume the responsibility for administering the discharge 
permit program,214 and they occasionally used their section 401 au-
thority to deny certiªcations to applicants for federal licenses and 
permits.215 Some states were also fairly aggressive in enforcing water 
pollution control requirements against federal agencies, but the Su-
preme Court frustrated those efforts by construing the waiver of im-
                                                                                                                      
210 Richard A. March et al., Nonpoint Source Water Pollution and Section 208 Planning: Le-
gal and Institutional Issues, 1981–1982 Agric. L.J. 324, 349 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
211 Frederick R. Anderson et al., Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 
356 (1984); see also Robert D. Fentress, Comment, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater, 
and the 1987 Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 Envtl. L. 807, 819 (1989). 
212 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
sec. 2, § 101(b), 86 Stat. 816, 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)); see supra note 
161 and accompanying text. 
213 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 95, 109–11 (1992); Champion Int’l 
Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 183–84 (4th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the Arkansas case, 
see William J. Holmes, Note, The Impact of Arkansas v. Oklahoma on the NPDES Process Under 
the Clean Water Act, 23 Envtl. L. 273 (1993). For a pessimistic assessment of the value of 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma for controlling interstate water pollution and a proposal for a statu-
tory reform, see Robert L. Glicksman, Watching the River Flow: The Prospects for Improved In-
terstate Water Pollution Control, 43 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 119 (1993). 
214 According to EPA’s website, only ªve states—Alaska, Idaho, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and New Mexico—do not have approved programs under section 402. See EPA, 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): State Program Status, at http://cfpub. 
epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last updated Apr. 14, 2003). 
215 See, e.g., PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 709, 713 (1994). 
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munity in section 313 as applying only to substantive requirements 
and not to state laws requiring polluters to obtain permits.216
C. Revisions to the 1972 Legislation 
 Since 1972, Congress has amended the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act on several occasions.217 This section summarizes the three 
major modiªcations: the amendments enacted in 1977, 1981, and 
1987.218
 In general, the amendments since 1972 have reªned the ap-
proach of the 1972 law. They have retained feasibility-based standards 
as the basic regulatory approach of the statute, although they have 
made important, incremental modiªcations to the Act—including 
relaxation of most of the original feasibility-based standards. Over the 
years, Congress increasingly has focused on problems associated with 
toxic pollutants, and it has strengthened enforcement provisions. 
Congress also has continued, and even expanded slightly, the state 
role in administering the statute. 
1. Clean Water Act of 1977 
 Congress adopted the most signiªcant revisions of the 1972 stat-
ute in 1977.219  The 1977 Amendments ofªcially acknowledged the 
                                                                                                                      
216 EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 215 (1976). For a criti-
cal analysis of the Supreme Court decision, see Kenneth M. Murchison, Waivers of Intergov-
ernmental Immunity in Federal Environmental Statutes, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1177 (1976). 
217 See, e.g., Estuaries and Clean Waters Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-457, 114 Stat. 1957 
(encouraging the restoration of estuary habitat through more efªcient project ªnancing 
and enhanced coordination of federal and non-federal restoration programs); Beaches 
Environmental Assessment and Coastal Health Act of 2000; Pub. L. No. 106-284, sec. 4, 
§ 406(b), 114 Stat. 870, 872 (authorizing EPA to award grants to localities that are adja-
cent to beaches or similar points of access used by the public and providing support for 
the development and implementation of programs to notify the public of the exposure to 
disease-causing microorganisms in coastal recreation waters); Ocean Pollution Reduction 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-431, 108 Stat. 4396 (1994) (amending the Clean Water Act with re-
spect to the ocean discharge of the city of San Diego); Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-688, sec. 3202(a), § 502, 102 Stat. 4139, 4154 (amending the Clean Water 
Act to include the term “medical waste” in the ban on ocean dumping); Act of Jan. 8, 1983, 
Pub. L. No. 97-440, 96 Stat. 2289 (amending the Clean Water Act to permit modiªcations 
“with respect to [certain] efºuent limitations . . . [relating] to biochemical oxygen de-
mand and pH”). 
218 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7–90; Municipal Wastewater 
Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623–
1633; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566–1611. 
219 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566–1611 (codiªed as 
amended in scattered sections within 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000)). 
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“Clean Water Act” label by which the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act had generally come to be known in the 1970s, adopting it as a 
second, or alternative, statutory name.220 Substantively, the Amend-
ments continued the feasibility-based focus of the 1972 legislation, but 
they made some important changes. The 1977 legislation signiªcantly 
modiªed the second step for implementing the 1972 standards, made 
modest revisions to the rules governing pretreatment standards, and 
authorized a variety of exceptions, waivers, and modiªcations of feasi-
bility-based standards in particular situations.221 With respect to toxic 
pollutants, the 1977 Amendments ratiªed the feasibility-based ap-
proach that EPA had embraced in its 1976 settlement with NRDC,222 
although Congress reafªrmed EPA’s discretionary authority to impose 
stricter standards when necessary to protect the aquatic environ-
ment.223 The 1977 Amendments also ratiªed the extension of the sec-
tion 404 permit program to wetlands and authorized states to assume 
responsibility for administering part of the program.224 Finally, the 
Amendments made modest alterations in the enforcement provisions 
and reversed a Supreme Court decision limiting the duty of federal 
agencies to comply with state permit requirements.225
 For point sources other than publicly owned treatment works, the 
1977 Amendments modiªed the second stage of feasibility-based 
standards and extended the deadline for meeting the standard. The 
revised standards now varied depending on the type of pollutants that 
a point source was discharging. The most signiªcant change involved 
“conventional pollutants,” such as “pollutants classiªed as biological 
oxygen demanding, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH.”226 For 
those pollutants, the 1977 legislation prescribed a new standard—the 
“best conventional pollutant control” technology (BCT)227—and re-
                                                                                                                      
220 See id. sec. 2, § 518, 91 Stat. 1566, 1566. 
221 See id. 
222 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
223 Id. sec. 48(b)(3), § 304(b)(4), 91 Stat. at 1587 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)). 
224 Id. sec. 67(b), § 404(g)(1), 91 Stat. at 1601 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1)). 
225 See EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 227 (1976). 
226 Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 48(a), § 304(a)(4), 91 Stat. at 1587 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4)). 
227 Id. sec. 48(b), § 304(b)(4), 91 Stat. at 1587 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)) 
(specifying factors). “This new level of technology, best conventional technology, is the 
equivalent of best practicable technology or something a little better, even as far as best 
available technology in some circumstances.” 123 Cong. Rec. 38,978 (1977) (statement of 
Rep. Harold Johnson). 
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quired that point sources meet the new standard by 1984.228 The fea-
sibility-based standard for all other pollutants remained BAT, but the 
amendments extended the 1983 deadline. For the toxic pollutants 
identiªed in section 307, the new BAT deadline was 1984;229 for pol-
lutants that were not classiªed as either toxic or conventional, the new 
BAT deadline was 1987.230
 Congress made minor revisions to the pretreatment provisions. 
The revised statute allowed EPA to grant local variances from pre-
treatment standards in order to give credit for the ability of a particu-
lar publicly owned treatment works to remove toxic pollutants during 
its pretreatment process.231 It also mandated that the permit of a pub-
licly owned treatment works include requirements for identifying 
signiªcant sources of pollutants subject to pretreatment standards as 
well as a program to enforce compliance with pretreatment stan-
dards.232
 The 1977 Amendments overturned a judicial decision that had 
threatened to subject some farm pollution to the regulatory provi-
sions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. In National Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit afªrmed a district court decision invalidating an 
EPA regulation that excluded irrigation return ºows from the permit 
requirements of the Act.233 In the 1977 Amendments, Congress re-
versed that decision by speciªcally excluding irrigation return ºows 
from the deªnition of point sources.234
                                                                                                                      
228 Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 42(a)(3), § 301(b)(2)(E), 91 Stat. at 1582 (codiªed 
as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E)). 
229 Id. For toxic pollutants that were subsequently added to the section 307 list, the dead-
line was three years after the establishment of BAT standards for the pollutant. Id. 
§ 301(b)(2)(D), 91 Stat. at 1583 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(D) 
(1982)). 
230 Id. § 301(b)(2)(F), 91 Stat. at 1583 (codiªed prior to amendment at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(b)(2)(F) (1982)). 
231 Id. sec. 54(a), § 307(b)(1), 91 Stat. at 1591 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(b)(1) (2000)). To obtain the variance, the source subject to pretreatment stan-
dards must demonstrate that the discharge from the publicly owned treatment works will 
not exceed limits that would apply if the source discharged directly into the navigable wa-
ters and that granting the variance will not prevent sludge use or disposal. 
232 Id. sec. 54(c)(1), § 402(b)(8), 91 Stat. at 1591 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(b)(8)). 
233 568 F.2d 1369, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
234 Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 33(b), § 502(14), 91 Stat. at 1577 (codiªed as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)). To make the exemption unmistakable, Congress also 
amended section 402 to provide expressly that EPA could not require permits from irriga-
tion return ºows. Id. sec. 33(c), § 402(l), 91 Stat. at 1577 (codiªed prior to amendment 
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 The 1972 legislation had proved ambiguous with respect to the 
appropriate administrative and judicial procedures to be followed in 
cases where EPA objected to a permit that a state with an approved 
program proposed to issue.235 The 1977 Amendments revised section 
402 to clarify that EPA was to assume permitting authority when a 
state refused to revise its permits to meet the objections of the EPA 
Administrator.236
 The 1977 Amendments authorized a number of modiªcations 
and extensions to the revised feasibility-based standards. For point 
sources other than publicly owned treatment works, the Amendments 
permitted EPA to extend the deadline for BAT standards until 1987 
for polluters making use of innovative technology with potential for 
industry-wide application 237  and allowed EPA to modify BAT stan-
dards for pollutants not classiªed as toxic if the modiªcation would 
not interfere with the goal of ªshable and swimmable water quality.238 
For publicly owned treatment works, the 1977 Amendments permit-
ted EPA to modify the secondary treatment standard for systems that 
discharged into deep marine waters239 and extended the secondary 
                                                                                                                      
at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l) (1982)). Congress did require that the section 208 planning process 
address “return ºows from irrigated agriculture, and their cumulative effects.” Id. 
sec. 33(a), § 208(b)(2)(F), 91 Stat. at 1577 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) 
(2000)). 
235 Compare Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1230 (6th Cir. 1978) (EPA 
veto of state permit is reviewable under section 509(b)(1)(F)), with Washington v. EPA, 
573 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1978) (EPA veto not reviewable under section 509(b)(1)(F)). 
The Supreme Court eventually resolved the conºict by allowing review in a 1980 decision 
involving a permit issued prior to December 2, 1977. Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 
445 U.S. 193, 196 (1980). 
236 Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 65(a), § 402(d)(4), 91 Stat. at 1599 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4)). 
237  Id. sec. 47, § 301(k), 91 Stat. at 1586–87 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(k)). 
238 Id. sec. 43, § 301(g), 91 Stat. at 1583 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)). 
To obtain the modiªcation, the owner or operator of the point source must demonstrate that 
the modiªcation will comply with BPT standards and will not cause any violation of applica-
ble water quality standards, that the modiªcation will not result in any additional require-
ments on any other point source, and that the modiªcation will not interfere with the goal of 
achieving ªshable and swimmable water quality. Id. 
239 Id. sec. 44, § 301(h), 91 Stat. at 1584 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h)). 
To obtain the modiªcation, the new subsection (h) required the applicant to establish to 
“the satisfaction of the Administrator” that: 
• A water quality standard applicable to the pollutant exists; 
• the modiªed requirement will not interfere with attainment of the water quality 
standard; 
• the applicant has created a monitoring system to track the impact of its dis-
charge; 
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treatment deadline for facilities that were unable to complete needed 
construction by the original 1977 date.240
 For toxic pollutants, the 1977 Amendments revised section 307 to 
conform to the feasibility-based approach embraced in the 1976 set-
tlement.241 The statute incorporated the list of sixty-ªve priority pol-
lutants identiªed in the settlement,242 but authorized EPA to revise 
the list in the future.243 The new amendments directed EPA to prom-
ulgate BAT standards for all pollutants on the list.244 Although the 
standards were to be established for categories of point sources, the 
1977 Amendments did not restrict them to the twenty-one categories 
covered by the 1976 settlement decree.245
 With respect to the section 404 program for the deposit of 
dredge and ªll material, the changes were more modest. Congress 
embraced the regulation of wetlands,246 but authorized the issuance 
of general permits for deposits of dredge and ªll materials that have 
only minimal environmental impacts. 247  Furthermore, Congress al-
lowed states to assume responsibility for administration of the section 
                                                                                                                      
• the modiªed requirement will not result in any additional requirements on any 
other source; 
• all applicable pretreatment requirements will be enforced; 
• a schedule of actions will eliminate the discharge of toxic pollutants into the 
treatment works; 
• the modiªed standard will not increase the discharge above the amount 
speciªed in the applicant’s permit; 
• the applicant will use any funds available to achieve the efºuent reduction. 
Id. 
240 Id. sec. 45, § 301(i), 91 Stat. at 1584 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i)). 
Section 45 also established a parallel extension for other point sources that discharged 
into a publicly owned treatment works that was entitled to the section 45 extension. 
241 See Ridgway M. Hall, Jr., The Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 Nat. Resources Law. 343, 
351–58 (1979). 
242 Id. at 353–54. 
243 Id. at 354. In revising the list, EPA was to consider the following factors: toxicity of 
the pollutant, its persistence, its degradability, the usual or potential presence of the af-
fected organisms in any waters, the importance of the affected organisms, and the nature 
and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms. Clean Water Act of 1977, 
sec. 53(a), § 307(a)(1), 91 Stat. at 1589 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1)). 
244 Hall, supra note 241. 
245 See Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 53(a), § 307(a)(2), 91 Stat. at 1589 (codiªed as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(5)); supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
246 See id. sec. 67, § 404, 91 Stat. at 1600 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344). 
247  Id. sec. 67(b), § 404(e), 91 Stat. at 1600 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(e)). 
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404 permit program in those areas that did not fall within the tradi-
tional deªnition of navigable waters.248
 Congress made a half-hearted effort to revive the planning proc-
ess for nonpoint sources. It amended section 208 by authorizing ap-
propriations to pay one-half of the cost incurred by farmers who im-
plemented best management practices (BMPs).249
 Congress also made some minor changes to the enforcement 
provisions of the Act. The 1977 Amendments authorized enforcement 
actions against persons whose discharges into publicly owned treat-
ment works violated the pretreatment standards of the Act.250 The 
1977 Amendments further endorsed the use of delayed compliance 
orders for dischargers who had applied for permits but could not 
meet BPT standards by 1977.251 The legislation also authorized en-
forcement actions against persons who violated the requirements of a 
permit for the deposit of dredge and ªll material.252
 In 1976, the Supreme Court had narrowly construed the broad 
waiver of federal immunity in the 1972 legislation,253 holding that the 
directive to comply with “all Federal, state, interstate, and local re-
quirements respecting control and abatement of water pollution” 
covered only substantive standards and did not include procedural 
mechanisms like permits.254  The 1977 Amendments overruled this 
decision and expanded the waiver to include “administrative author-
ity, and process and sanctions.”255 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
later adhered to its rule of strict construction, holding that the 
                                                                                                                      
248 Id. § 404(g), 91 Stat. at 1601 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)). 
249  Id. sec. 35, § 208(j)(2), 91 Stat. at 1580 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1288(j)(2)). Professor Rodgers offers a concise but clear critique of this program: “Pay-
ing half of the cleanup costs . . . not otherwise commending themselves to the users is an 
unlikely way to provoke a steady raid on the treasury. Altruism, discounted by ªfty percent, 
has yet to win its ªrst political campaign.” 2 Rodgers, supra note 66, at § 4-9. 
250  Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 54(b), § 309(f), 91 Stat. at 1591 (codiªed as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(f)). 
251 Id. sec. 56(a), (c), § 309(a)(2), (5), 91 Stat. at 1592–93 (codiªed as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2), (5)). 
252  Id. sec. 67(c)(2)(C), § 309(c)(1), 91 Stat. at 1606 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(c)(1)(A)). 
253 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
sec. 2, § 313, 86 Stat. 816, 875 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)); see supra 
notes 171, 216 and accompanying text. 
254 EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 209–12 (1976) (quot-
ing 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. IV 1974)); see supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
255 Clean Water Act of 1977, secs. 60, 61(a), § 313(a)–(b), 91 Stat. at 1597, 1598 
(codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)–(b) (2000)). 
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amended waiver did not authorize monetary penalties against the 
United States except as a sanction for violating a judicial order.256
 A contemporaneous analysis of the 1977 Amendments character-
ized them as “extensive ªne tuning of a complex statute.”257 Accord-
ing to the former Associate General Counsel for Water at EPA, the 
new statute “eased a number of the burdens” that the 1972 Act had 
imposed on the agency and the courts and “clariªed many of the un-
certainties of the prior legislation.”258 At the same time, he noted, the 
1977 Amendments “imposed some additional responsibilities” on 
governmental agencies responsible for implementing the statute, “on 
the industries and others who must comply with the new require-
ments,” and on the “taxpayers [who] are ªnancing the cleanup of our 
nation’s waters.”259
 A somewhat less sympathetic assessment of the 1977 legislation 
might describe the Amendments as accepting those minimal feasibil-
ity-based standards that had not proved too costly, while ignoring the 
ultimate objectives of the 1972 Act. Complete attainment of the no-
discharge goal of the 1972 Act260 may have been impossible, but the 
original mandate to achieve BAT standards was a pragmatic imple-
mentation of that objective. Even where the total elimination of water 
pollution was unattainable, the 1972 Amendments tried to insure that 
pollution was at least minimized to the extent that costs permitted.261 
The 1977 Amendments abandoned that goal as a requirement appli-
cable to all pollutants discharged by a point source 262  and even 
granted modiªcations, waivers, and extensions from the original, 
more modest stage of reductions. 263  Moreover, after loosening the 
feasibility-based standards, Congress did nothing to address the ambi-
ent-based goals of the 1972 statute. The move to BAT standards for 
                                                                                                                      
256 U.S. Dep’t. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 623–28 (1992). See generally Kenneth M. 
Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement: Lessons from Twenty Years of Waiving Federal 
Immunity to State Regulation, 11 Va. Envtl. L.J. 179, 210–23 (1992). 
257 Hall, supra note 241, at 372. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
sec. 2, § 101(a)(1), 86 Stat. 816, 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2000)); see supra 
note 74 and accompanying text. 
261 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 101(a)(1), 86 
Stat. at 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)). 
262 See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text. 
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toxic pollutants reºected an abandonment of the policy264 to elimi-
nate the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts, and nothing 
in the 1977 law seemed designed to force EPA to use section 303 to 
move toward the ambient goal of ªshable and swimmable waters 
throughout the nation.265
2. Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments 
of 1981 
 As the name suggests, the primary aim of the Municipal Wastewa-
ter Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981 was to mod-
ify the program providing federal support for the construction of 
publicly owned treatment works.266 However, the 1981 Amendments 
also affected the regulatory provisions of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, or as it had been called since 1977, the Clean Water Act. 
They further weakened and diluted the feasibility-based standards of 
the 1972 and 1977 legislation, while making modest improvements in 
the water quality standards. 
 The driving force behind the 1981 Amendments was the need to 
reauthorize the federal grant program for publicly owned treatment 
works, and Congress authorized annual appropriations of $2.4 billion 
through ªscal year 1985.267  The authorization represented a slight 
reduction in federal expenditures for the construction of treatment 
works in ªscal years 1981 through 1983. 268  More signiªcantly, the 
1981 Amendments reduced the federal share of construction project 
costs from seventy-ªve percent to ªfty-ªve percent beginning with 
grants made after October 1984.269 Congress did, however, authorize 
an expansion of the federal share for a limited number of projects 
that involved the use of innovative technology. 270  In addition, the 
                                                                                                                      
264 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 101(a)(3), 86 
Stat. at 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3)); see supra note 122 and accompanying 
text. 
265 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 101(a)(2), 
86 Stat. at 816 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)); see supra note 115 and accompanying 
text. 
266 See Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623 (codiªed as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). 
267 Id. sec. 17, § 207, 95 Stat. at 1630 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1287 
(2000)). The maximum authorization was $7 billion for the 1975 ªscal year, and the 
amount declined to approximately $2.5 billion annually in the 1980s. Id. 
268 See id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. sec. 8(a), § 202(a)(2), 95 Stat. at 1625 (codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1282(a)(2)). 
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1981 legislation made a variety of technical changes in the construc-
tion grant program.271
 A few important changes applicable to the regulatory require-
ments of the Clean Water Act appeared in the 1981 Amendments. 
Statutory changes eliminated entirely the stricter standards that were 
scheduled to become applicable to publicly owned treatment works in 
1983,272 declared that certain biological treatment processes “shall be 
deemed the equivalent of secondary treatment,”273 and expanded the 
availability of waivers of secondary treatment requirements for pub-
licly owned treatment works that discharge into the ocean.274  The 
Amendments did mandate revision of the state water quality stan-
dards, but the mandate to revise did not extend to the TMDLs that 
implemented the standards.275
 Basically, the 1981 Amendments continued the pattern of dilut-
ing the feasibility-based standards of the 1972 legislation without sub-
stituting a commitment to protect water quality. They reduced federal 
support for construction of treatment works, eliminated the 1983 
standards for publicly owned treatment works, and expanded the ex-
                                                                                                                      
271 See, e.g., id. sec. 2(a), § 201(g)(1), 95 Stat. at 1623 (codiªed prior to amendment at 
33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(1) (1976)) (allowing grants for “new interceptors and appurtenances, 
and inªltration-in-ºow correction”); id. sec. 5, § 201(n), 95 Stat. at 1624 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1281(n)(1) (2000)) (allowing grants “to address water quality problems due to 
the impacts of discharges from combined storm water and sanitary sewer overºows”); id. 
sec. 6, § 201(o), 95 Stat. at 1625 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1281(o)) (requiring a capital 
ªnancing plan that addresses “future requirements for waste treatment services . . . for a 
period of no less than ten years”); id. sec. 11, § 204(a)(6), 95 Stat. at 1627 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1284(a)(6)) (allowing the use of “brand name or equal” speciªcations); id. 
sec. 12, § 204(d), 95 Stat. at 1627 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1284(d)) (requiring that the 
engineering ªrm supervising construction maintain its relationship with the agency for 
which the work is constructed for one year following the completion of construction). 
272  Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, 
sec. 21(b), § 301(b)(2)(B), 95 Stat. at 1632 (repealing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(B) 
(1976)); see supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
273 Id. sec. 23, § 304(d)(4), 95 Stat. at 1632 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(4) 
(2000)). 
274 Id. sec. 22, § 301(h), ( j)(1), 95 Stat. at 1632 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h), 
( j)(1)). 
275 Id., sec. 24, § 303(c), 95 Stat. at 1632 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1313a). The Confer-
ence Committee deleted the reference to total maximum daily loads that had been in-
cluded in the Senate bill. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-408, at 26 (1981), reprinted in 1981 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2656, 2669. Section 24 did preclude any construction grants in states that 
failed to complete the review and revision process within three years “except where the 
State has in good faith submitted such revised water quality standards and the Administra-
tor has not acted to approve or disapprove such submission within one hundred and 
twenty days of receipt.” Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amend-
ments of 1981, sec. 24, § 303(c), 95 Stat. at 1632 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1313a). 
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ceptions to the secondary treatment requirement, but did little to im-
prove ambient-based standards. The demand for new water quality 
standards was only a gesture without a requirement for controls 
sufªcient to meet those standards. 
3. Water Quality Act of 1987 
 In the 1980s Congress again revised the Clean Water Act with the 
Water Quality Act of 1987.276 For publicly owned treatment works, the 
1987 statute replaced the construction grant program with a revolving 
loan fund. For other point sources, Congress retained the feasibility-
based approach of prior legislation, but the new amendments again 
extended deadlines and added a variety of other modiªcations of the 
statutory requirements. The 1987 Amendments did, however, address 
three problems that had escaped effective regulation under earlier 
legislation: toxic pollutants, pollution from nonpoint sources, and 
stormwater discharges. In addition, Congress expanded the options 
available to EPA in enforcing the statute. 
 Authorization levels for the construction grant program had 
been declining throughout the 1980s,277 and the 1987 law brought 
the program to a gradual end.278 In its place, Congress established a 
                                                                                                                      
276 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7. In addition to the provi-
sions discussed in the text, see id. sec. 310, § 308(b), 101 Stat. at 41 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1318(b) (2000)) (obligating the Administrator to require the owner or operator of any 
point source to maintain records and to provide any other necessary information, granting 
the Administrator right of entry to any premises in which an efºuent source is located, 
making any information obtained available to the public unless the Administrator ªnds 
that it must be kept conªdential, and making all information reported available to author-
ized committee of Congress upon request); id. sec. 315, § 314(a), 101 Stat. at 49 (codiªed 
at 33 U.S.C. § 1324) (requiring states to submit speciªed information on their lakes to the 
Administrator on a biennial basis and requiring the Administrator to submit a report to 
Congress on the status of water quality in lakes in the United States); id. sec. 317, § 320, 
101 Stat. at 61 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1330) (allowing each state to nominate to the Ad-
ministrator an estuary of national signiªcance and to request a management conference to 
develop a comprehensive management plan for the estuary); id. sec. 403, § 402(n), 101 
Stat. at 66 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(n)) (allowing state to submit a permit program 
for a portion of the discharges into the navigable waters of the state). 
277 See 33 U.S.C. § 1287. The maximum authorization was $7 billion for the 1975 ªscal 
year, and the amount steadily declined until the grant program was eliminated after the 
1990 ªscal year. Id. 
278 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 211, § 207, 101 Stat. at 21 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1287). Construction funding was reduced from $2.4 billion in ªscal years 1986–88 to 
$1.2 billion for ªscal years 1989 and 1990. Congress did not authorize any additional ap-
propriations for grants after 1990. See id. 
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new system of revolving loan funds to assist states and local govern-
ments with capitalization grants.279
 The 1987 Amendments modiªed the existing feasibility regime in 
a variety of ways. They extended the ªnal deadlines for compliance 
with BAT and BCT until 1989 280  and speciªed ªve pollutants for 
which EPA could—with the concurrence of the state—modify best 
available technology when the modiªcation would not interfere with 
protection of public water supplies or ªshable and swimmable water 
quality.281 Congress also made minor revisions to the exemption from 
secondary treatment for publicly owned treatment works discharging 
into marine waters282  and allowed publicly owned treatment works 
additional time to apply for extensions of the deadline for secondary 
treatment. 283  For other point sources, the 1987 Amendments ex-
tended the deadline for complying with feasibility-based standards by 
use of innovative technology,284 and codiªed EPA regulation allowing 
variances from BAT for point sources that are fundamentally different 
with respect to the factors EPA considered in setting the standards for 
the categories to which they are assigned.285
 Even though EPA had never used section 302, the 1987 Amend-
ments created an exception to the ambient-based standards that 
could be established under that section.286 After the revision, the Ad-
ministrator could, “with the concurrence of the state,” modify the ad-
ditional controls needed to achieve the ªshable and swimmable stan-
dard for a period of not more than ªve years.287 EPA could grant the 
modiªcation if it represented the “maximum degree of control within 
                                                                                                                      
279 Id. sec. 212(a), §§ 601–607, 101 Stat. at 21 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1387) 
(adding Title VI to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act). 
280 Id. sec. 301, § 301(b), 101 Stat. at 29 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C)–(F)). 
281 Id. sec. 302, § 301(g), 101 Stat. at 30 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(1)). 
282 Id. sec. 303, § 301(h), ( j), 101 Stat. at 33 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h), ( j)). 
283 Id. sec. 304(a), § 301(i), 101 Stat. at 34 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i)(1)). 
284 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 305, § 301(k), 101 Stat. at 34 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(k)). 
285 Id. sec. 306(a), § 301(n), 101 Stat. at 35 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n)). The 
Supreme Court had ruled that the law prior to the 1987 Amendments allowed variances 
for plants with fundamentally different factors. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 
134 (1985). 
286 See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text. 
287 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 308(e), § 302(b), 101 Stat. at 39 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)). These requirements are the same as those required to obtain a vari-
ance from BAT standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c). 
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the economic capability of the owner” and resulted in “reasonable 
further progress” toward the requirements of section 302.288
 Advances in the ability to detect small concentrations of water 
pollutants increasingly conªrmed that the BAT approach to toxic wa-
ter pollutants had failed to achieve the Clean Water Act policy of pro-
hibiting the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts.289 The 
1987 Amendments included three provisions aimed at toxic pollut-
ants; they required states to establish numerical limits for water qual-
ity standards applicable to toxic pollutants, to identify waters that 
failed to achieve toxic water pollutant standards because of discharges 
from point sources, and to implement individual control strategies for 
those point sources to insure that the water quality standards are 
achieved. 
 A substantial obstacle to achieving water quality standards for 
toxic pollutants was the widespread use of narrative criteria in the 
standards.290 To make the process of converting water quality stan-
dards into enforceable efºuent limits easier, section 308(d) of the 
1987 Amendments required states to use EPA water quality criteria to 
establish water quality standards for toxic pollutants and to use 
“speciªc numeric criteria” for the standards for toxic pollutants.291
 The establishment of numerical criteria in state water quality 
standards for toxic pollutants provided the basis for a new effort to 
achieve those standards. The ªrst step in the new effort required 
states to identify and to submit to the EPA Administrator lists of waters 
that failed to meet water quality standards.292 The most important of 
these lists required states to identify those waters where the standards 
were not expected to be achieved “due entirely or substantially to dis-
charges from point sources of any toxic pollutants listed.”293
                                                                                                                      
288 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 308(e), § 302(b), 101 Stat. at 39 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)). 
289 Houck, supra note 185, at 10,539 (“[B]y the mid-1980s Congress was again turning 
to the challenge of upgrading the nation’s waters. . . . The bad news was that the continu-
ing declines were substantial and, worse, that 14,000 stream miles, 638,000 acres of lakes, 
and 900 square miles of estuaries had ‘acute toxic problems.’”). 
290 See Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 308(a), § 304(l)(1), 101 Stat. at 38 (codiªed at 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)). 
291 Id. sec. 308(d), § 303(c)(2), 101 Stat. at 39 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B)). 
292 Id. sec. 308(a), § 304(l)(1), 101 Stat. at 38 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)). 
293 Id. The other two lists covered waters where toxic water quality standards were not 
attained, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)(A)(i), and any waters that failed to achieve the ªshable 
and swimmable goal. Id. § 1314(l)(1)(A)(ii). See generally Houck, supra note 185, at 
10,547–49. 
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 Having identiªed both waters where discharges from point 
sources were causing violations of water quality standards for toxic 
pollutants and the speciªc point sources that were contributing to the 
problem, states then had to develop and submit to the EPA Adminis-
trator an “individual control strategy” for each of those point 
sources. 294  “[I]n combination with existing controls on point and 
nonpoint sources of pollution,” the individual control strategies had 
to be sufªcient “to achieve the applicable water quality standard[s]” 
within three years.295 If the state failed to submit the individual con-
trol strategies required by the 1987 Amendments or if the EPA Ad-
ministrator disapproved the state submission, the Administrator was 
responsible for implementing the new requirements.296
 The 1987 Amendments launched another attempt to control pol-
lution from nonpoint sources. Congress made “expeditious” control 
of pollution from nonpoint sources a “national policy”297 and directed 
states to make another effort to address problems stemming from 
nonpoint sources.298 The new section required states to identify wa-
ters that failed to meet water quality standards299 because of pollution 
from nonpoint sources and to prepare management plans to achieve 
those water quality standards.300 Congress did not, however, mandate 
that management programs include regulatory limits on nonpoint 
sources,301 and the new section gave EPA only limited authority to en-
sure compliance with the new directive. Each state had to submit to 
EPA for approval a report identifying the waters that failed to meet 
water quality standards because of nonpoint source pollution.302 The 
report also had to identify the categories of nonpoint sources that 
                                                                                                                      
294 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 308(a), § 304(l)(1)(D), 101 Stat. at 38 (codiªed at 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)(D)). 
295 Id. 
296 Id. sec. 308(a), § 304(l)(3), 101 Stat. at 38 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(3)). 
297 Id. sec. 316(b), § 101(a)(7), 101 Stat. at 60 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7)). 
298 Id. sec. 316(a), § 319(b)(1), 101 Stat. at 52 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1)). 
299 Id. § 319, 101 Stat. at 52 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1329); see Daniel R. Mandelker, 
Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 479 (1989); 
Fentress, supra note 211. 
300 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 316(a), § 319(a), 101 Stat. at 52 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1329(a)). 
301 See id. § 319(b)(2)(B), 101 Stat. at 53 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(B)). In-
stead, the management programs had to include “[a]n identiªcation of programs (includ-
ing, as appropriate, nonregulatory or regulatory programs for enforcement, technical 
assistance, ªnancial assistance, education, training, technology transfer, and demonstra-
tion projects) to achieve implementation of the best management practices by the catego-
ries, subcategories, and particular nonpoint sources.” Id. 
302 Id. § 319(a)(1)(A), 101 Stat. at 52 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A)). 
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contributed to the failure to meet the water quality standard and to 
set forth a management plan for achieving the standard.303 If a state 
failed to make a submission or if the submission was inadequate, EPA 
could identify the impaired waters, but the agency was not authorized 
to prepare a federal management plan. Instead, the EPA Administra-
tor was to “report to Congress on his actions.”304
 The 1987 legislation also included new provisions regarding 
stormwater discharges.305 Stormwater discharges from agricultural run-
off were newly exempted from the deªnition of point sources,306 and 
Congress also added an exemption from the permit requirement for 
stormwater discharges from oil, gas, and mining operations. 307  For 
other point sources, the 1987 Amendments conªrmed the applicability 
of the permit requirement for stormwater discharges.308 However, Con-
gress delayed its implementation until 1994 for municipalities with 
populations of fewer than 100,000 309  and phased in the permit re-
quirements for larger cities and industrial point sources.310 Industrial 
polluters and large publicly owned treatment works had to obtain per-
mits,311 and municipal storm sewers had to eliminate non-stormwater 
discharges into storm sewers.312
 Finally, the 1987 Amendments expanded the enforcement op-
tions available to EPA under the Clean Water Act. The new law in-
creased the maximum civil penalty, gave EPA authority to impose 
                                                                                                                      
303 Id. 
304 Id. § 319(d)(3), 101 Stat. at 55 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d)(3)). 
305 See generally Thomas G. Echikson & Gregory P. Lauro, When It Rains It Pours: Past, 
Present, and Future Regulation of Wet Weather Discharges, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,150 (2004); Edwin A. Skoch, II, Regulation of Storm Water Discharges Under the Clean Water 
Act, 23 Envtl. L. 1087, 1087–94 (1993); David Striºing, Comment, Sanitary Sewer Overºows: 
Past, Present, and Future Regulation, 87 Marq. L. Rev. 225, 230–32 (2003); Laurel A. David, 
Student Article, The EPA’s Combined Sewer Overºow Abatement Methods: Do They Comply with the 
Clean Water Act?, 35 Urb. Law. 533, 541–44 (2003). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recently upheld EPA’s 1999 rule subjecting discharges from small municipal sewers and 
construction sites to the permitting requirement of section 402. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. 
EPA, 319 F.3d 398, 498 (9th Cir. 2003); see also City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 663–65 
(5th Cir. 2003) (EPA had authority to condition storm water discharge permits issued to 
cities on implementation of pollution control programs by cities). 
306 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); see supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
307 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 401, § 402(l)(2), 101 Stat. at 65 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2)). 
308 Id. sec. 405, § 402(p), 101 Stat. at 69 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)). 
309 Id. § 402(p)(1)–(2), 101 Stat. at 70 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(1)–(2)). 
310 Id. § 402(p)(4), 101 Stat. at 70 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)). 
311  Id. § 402(p)(2)(B)–(D), (3), 101 Stat. at 69 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(p)(2)(B)–(D), (3)). 
312 Id. § 402(p)(3)(B), 101 Stat. at 70 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)). 
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some penalties administratively, and strengthened the criminal prohi-
bitions of the statute. 
 The maximum civil penalty increased from $10,000 to $25,000 
per day of violation.313 At the same time, however, Congress clariªed 
that the maximum penalty applied per incident rather than per pol-
lutant. The 1987 Amendments declared that “a single operational up-
set” was to be treated as a single violation even if it led to the violation 
of more than one pollution parameter.314
 Following a pattern begun in the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976,315 the 1987 Amendments also allowed EPA and 
the Corps of Engineers to impose some civil penalties administra-
tively.316  Under the 1987 Amendments, the maximum penalty that 
can be imposed administratively varies according to the procedures 
that the agency has to follow and the appropriate venue for judicial 
review.317 The maximums for a Class I penalty are $10,000 per viola-
tion and $25,000 per proceeding.318 In a Class I penalty, the agency 
has to provide the alleged violator an opportunity for a hearing; how-
ever, the hearing does not have to satisfy the requirements for a hear-
ing under the Administrative Procedure Act,319 and judicial review is 
available in the district court.320 The maximums for a Class II penalty 
are $10,000 per day of violation and $125,000 per proceeding. 321  
When a Class II penalty is assessed, the agency must give the alleged 
violator an opportunity for a hearing that satisªes the Administrative 
Procedure Act requirements, and judicial review is available in the 
                                                                                                                      
313 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 313(b)(1), § 309(d), 101 Stat. at 45 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(d)). The Federal Civil Penalty Inºation Adjustment Act of 1990 requires 
EPA to issue regulations adjusting for inºation the maximum monetary penalties the 
agency can impose. Pub. L. No. 101-410, 104 Stat. 890 (codiªed at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 
(2000)). In February 2004, EPA increased the penalties by 17.3%. See Civil Monetary Pen-
alty Inºation Adjustment Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 7121 (Feb. 13, 2004) (codiªed at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 19, 27). 
314 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 314(a), § 309(g)(3), 101 Stat. at 47 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3)). 
315 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (2000). 
316 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 314(a), § 309(g)(1), 101 Stat. at 46 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1)). 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. See generally William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?—Using Informal Pro-
cedure for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1 (1993). 
320 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 314(a), § 309(g)(8)(A), 101 Stat. at 48 (codiªed at 
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8)(A)). 
321 Id. 
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court of appeals. 322  Before either class of penalty is assessed, the 
agency must provide public notice of the proposed penalty and inter-
ested persons may offer comments, request a hearing, and seek judi-
cial review.323 An administrative sanction under the new provision or a 
“comparable” state law precludes either a civil enforcement action or 
a citizen suit designed to collect a civil penalty.324
 Congress also amended the criminal penalties of the Clean Water 
Act in the 1987 Amendments. The Amendments increased the penal-
ties for negligent and knowing violations and expanded them to cover 
violations involving the introduction of pollutants into a sewer system 
or publicly owned treatment works.325 They also increased the penalty 
for making false statements or falsifying a monitoring device326 and 
created a new felony—punishable by imprisonment for up to ªfteen 
years—for any knowing violation of the Clean Water Act when the vio-
lator knew that the violation would place another in imminent danger 
of death or serious bodily injury.327
 Of the 1987 legislation’s changes, one can describe only the ex-
panded enforcement options as an unambiguous improvement in the 
regulatory regime of the Clean Water Act. 328  Otherwise, the 1987 
Amendments continued the pattern of weakening the feasibility-based 
standards of the Clean Water Act without forcing the adoption of am-
bient-based standards to address the widespread failure to achieve wa-
ter quality standards. The federal funding that had produced installa-
tion of secondary treatment by most publicly owned treatment works 
ceased, and new exceptions were added to the feasibility-based stan-
dards. Congress even delayed the imposition of the permit require-
ment for stormwater discharges, a requirement that should have 
                                                                                                                      
322 Id. 
323 Id. § 309(g)(4), 101 Stat. at 47 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)). 
324 Id. § 309(g)(6), 101 Stat. at 47 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)). 
325  Id. sec. 312, § 309(c)(1)–(2), 101 Stat. at 42–43 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(c)(1)–(2)). 
326 Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 312, § 309(c)(4), 101 Stat. at 44 (codiªed at 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4)). 
327 Id. § 309(c)(3)(A), 101 Stat. at 43 (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A)). 
328 However, the enforcement amendments failed to address the Supreme Court’s re-
strictive interpretation of the waiver of federal immunity to monetary penalties imposed by 
state administrative agencies. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. The omission is 
somewhat surprising because the 1986 amendments to the Resource, Conservation, and 
Recovery Act had subjected federal agencies to administrative penalties for violations of 
that statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (2000). Presumably, environmental activists regarded the 
federal violations of hazardous waste regulations as a greater problem than federal viola-
tions of water pollution control regulations. 
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taken effect in 1977. At the same time, Congress neglected to substi-
tute meaningful ambient-based controls to achieve either the ªshable 
and swimmable goal of the federal statute or state water quality stan-
dards. The 1987 Amendments continued to accept the feasibility-
based approach for toxic pollutants, crafted an additional exception 
under section 302, and failed to require states to regulate pollution 
from nonpoint sources even when that pollution contributed to the 
violation of water quality standards. The “individual control strategies” 
approach for point sources causing violations of water quality stan-
dards for toxic pollutants was an innovative one. However, the effec-
tiveness of this innovation was limited; it only applied to violations 
resulting “entirely or substantially” from point source discharges of 
toxic pollutants,329 and it did not clearly impose an ongoing obliga-
tion to revise the individual control strategies until the water quality 
standard was achieved.330
II. Revival of Water Quality Standards in the Courts 
 As Part I has described, Congress shifted the regulatory strategy 
of federal water pollution control legislation to a feasibility-based 
model in 1972, and that approach has remained the dominant focus 
of federal regulation for more than three decades. In the 1990s, how-
ever, judicial decisions revived water quality standards as a supplement 
to the feasibility-based standards. Moreover, the future of ambient-
based controls remains one of the principal questions regarding the 
scope of federal water pollution controls in the twenty-ªrst century. 
 By the 1990s, many water quality problems remained despite im-
plementation of the feasibility-based standards for point sources. En-
vironmentalists urged EPA to require further reductions in pollution 
to achieve the water quality standards established under section 303. 
When the agency was reluctant to use section 303, environmental 
groups ªled suits seeking to force EPA to act. Decisions of lower fed-
eral courts held that EPA must identify waters that fail to meet water 
quality standards and prepare TMDLs for those waters when states fail 
to perform their responsibilities under section 303. 
                                                                                                                      
329 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)(B). 
330 EPA has construed the obligation as an ongoing one, but a number of states have 
viewed section 304(l) as imposing a one-time requirement. See Percival et al., supra note 
54, at 651. 
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 As noted above,331 EPA moved slowly to implement the require-
ments of section 303. The agency did not even identify the pollutants 
for which the calculation of TMDLs was appropriate until late 1978.332 
Once EPA identiªed the pollutants, states were to designate waters 
that failed to meet water quality standards within 180 days.333 States, 
however, generally ignored that requirement; moreover, forcing fur-
ther action was difªcult. The Clean Water Act provision allowing citi-
zen suits to demand the performance of nondiscretionary duties334 
applied only to duties imposed on EPA, and EPA’s duties arose only 
when the agency disapproved the waters or the TMDLs submitted by a 
state.335 EPA took the position that its duty to prepare TMDLs arose 
only when a state submitted an inadequate TMDL, and not when the 
state submitted no TMDLs at all. 
 As early as 1984, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals articulated 
the theory that ultimately forced EPA to act. In a citizen suit challeng-
ing the failure of EPA to prepare TMDLs for Lake Michigan, the court 
ruled that a failure to submit TMDLs “over a long period of time” could 
“amount to the ‘constructive submission’ by that state of no TMDLs.”336 
When the state’s delay was sufªcient to constitute a constructive sub-
mission of no TMDLs, EPA had a nondiscretionary duty to approve or 
to disapprove the submission, and the agency could be ordered to per-
form that duty in a citizen suit. If EPA approved the submission, review 
of that decision was available under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.337 If EPA disapproved the submission, the agency had a nondiscre-
tionary duty to prepare a TMDL within thirty days.338
 The 1984 decision did little to force either the state or EPA to 
prepare TMDLs. In the 1990s, however, environmental groups initi-
ated a series of actions designed to force EPA to act. They eventually 
ªled suits challenging the agency’s failure to prepare TMDLs for at 
least thirty-nine states.339
                                                                                                                      
331 See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text. 
332 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1) (2000). 
333 Id. § 1313(d)(2). 
334 Id. § 1365. 
335 Id. § 1313(b)(1). 
336 Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1984). 
337 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (“[F]inal agency action for which there is no other adequate 
remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.”). 
338 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). 
339 EPA, Total Maximum Daily Loads: TMDL Litigation by State (Oct. 1, 2004), at http:// 
www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/lawsuit1.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2005). 
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 The ªrst suit of the 1990s involved Alaska.340 Like the states in-
volved in the Seventh Circuit litigation, Alaska had prepared no 
TMDLs. The district court ruled that the state’s failure to submit 
TMDLs for over a decade was a “constructive submission” of “no 
TMDLs” and triggered a mandatory duty that EPA prepare the 
TMDLs.341 In its appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, EPA 
did not seek review of the “constructive submission” ruling; instead, 
the appeal challenged the plaintiff’s standing and certain aspects of 
the remedy granted by the district court.342
 As the Alaska appeal was pending, EPA adopted a regulation to 
implement section 303.343 The regulation required states to submit 
biennial revisions to their identiªcations of waters not meeting water 
quality standards and to their priority rankings of those waters. It did 
not, however, set a deadline by which the TMDLs for the identiªed 
waters had to be established, nor did it obligate EPA to prepare 
TMDLs when a state failed to act. 
 Environmental groups increasingly turned to litigation to speed 
the pace of preparation of TMDLs.344 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Minnesota held that the state’s submission of forty-three 
loads was sufªcient to satisfy the state’s duty to submit TMDLs in ac-
cordance with its priority ranking of waters in the state,345 and a dis-
trict court judge in New York ruled that the adequacy of the state’s 
submission of TMDLs had to be reviewed under the Administrative 
Procedure Act rather than the citizen suit provision of the Clean Wa-
ter Act.346 In other states, however, environmental groups had more 
success. A district court rejected a twenty-ªve-year schedule for prepa-
ration of TMDLs in Idaho,347 and district court judges in Georgia348 
and Louisiana349 ordered EPA to prepare TMDLs according to a ªxed 
schedule. 
                                                                                                                      
340 Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992). 
341 Id. at 1381. 
342 Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1994). 
343 Surface Water Toxics Control Program and Water Quality Planning and Manage-
ment Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,039 ( July 24, 1992) (codiªed as amended at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 130.7 (2004)). 
344 See Houck, supra note 198, at 190–93. 
345 Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (D. Minn. 1993). 
346 NRDC v. Fox, 30 F. Supp. 2d 369, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
347 Idaho Sportsmen’s Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962, 967 (W.D. Wash. 1996). 
348 Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865, 873 (N.D. Ga. 1996). 
349 See Sierra Club v. Clifford, 47 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1417, 1431–32 (E.D. La. 1998), 
rev’d on other grounds, 257 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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 The litigation prompted further action by EPA. The agency as-
serted its authority (but not its duty) to act when states failed to iden-
tify waters that did not meet water quality standards. A 1997 EPA 
memorandum recommended that regional ofªces negotiate sched-
ules of eight to thirteen years for states to prepare TMDLs.350 That 
same year, the agency negotiated agreements with several states and 
entered into a number of consent decrees that required preparation 
of TMDLs over periods ranging from ªve to twenty years.351
 In an effort to generate a consensus on section 303, EPA ap-
pointed an advisory committee to study the TMDL program. A major-
ity of the members of the committee approved a ªnal report generally 
endorsing the agency’s approach. 352  The committee report recom-
mended that EPA require states to prepare TMDLs on an eight- to 
ªfteen-year schedule.353
 In July 2000, EPA revised its rule on preparation of total maxi-
mum daily loads.354 The new rule required states to develop more 
comprehensive lists of waters that failed to meet water quality stan-
dards.355 It then obligated the states to specify what reductions were 
necessary from both point sources and nonpoint sources if the stan-
dards were to be achieved.356 Finally, the states had to develop sched-
ules to achieve the water quality standards within ten years, although 
EPA could grant a ªve-year extension. 357  However, the new rule 
stopped short of requiring regulatory controls on nonpoint sources of 
pollution; instead, states could rely on incentives and other voluntary 
controls so long as the state plan provided “reasonable assurance” that 
the water quality standard would be achieved.358
                                                                                                                      
350 Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator, Ofªce of Wetlands, 
Oceans, and Watersheds, EPA, to Regional Administrators Regional Water Division Direc-
tors (Aug. 8, 1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/ratepace.html (last up-
dated Feb. 16, 2005). 
351 See EPA, supra note 339. 
352 See Fed. Advisory Comm. on the Total Maximum Daily Load Program, Nat’l 
Advisory Council for Envtl. Policy & Tech., Report of the Federal Advisory 
Committee on the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) Program ( July 1998), avail-
able at http://meso.spawar.navy.mil/Newsltr/Refs/100-R-98-006.pdf. 
353 Id. at i. 
354 Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revi-
sions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 
( July 13, 2000). 
355 Id. at 43,664. 
356 See id. at 43,667. 
357 Id. at 43,666. 
358 Id. at 43,668. 
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 The adoption of the revised rule was the high-water mark for the 
implementation of section 303. The rule attracted criticism from a 
variety of sources, and it never became effective. Congress postponed 
the original effective date until at least October 2001,359 and the Bush 
administration granted a further extension until April 2003. 360  In 
March 2003, EPA ªnally revoked the July 2000 rule with a vague 
promise of future reforms.361
 Recent litigation suggests that the courts are unlikely to force 
EPA to create an effective ambient-based program under section 303. 
The Ninth Circuit did conªrm EPA’s authority to prepare TMDLs for 
a river polluted only by nonpoint sources of pollution,362 but both it 
and the Tenth Circuit have limited the “constructive submission” the-
ory to cases where the state has submitted no TMDLs at all.363 The 
Second Circuit deferred to an agency interpretation that allows total 
maximum “daily” loads under the Clean Water Act to be determined 
on an annual rather than a daily basis.364 The Fifth Circuit ruled that 
a district court’s referral of a section 303 lawsuit to a special master 
was improper,365 and the Eleventh Circuit held that a district court 
exceeded its discretion when it ordered EPA to prepare an implemen-
tation plan for the TMDLs the agency had established for the state of 
Georgia.366 In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court invalidated an in-
novative TMDL that allowed efºuent trading between point and non-
point sources because the state agency had not used rulemaking pro-
cedures to establish the TMDL.367
                                                                                                                      
359 Military Construction Appropriations Act, Fiscal 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-246, tit. 2, 
ch. 8, 114 Stat. 511, 567 (2000). 
360 Effective Date of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regula-
tion and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in 
Support of Revisions to the Water Quality and Planning Regulations; and Revision of the 
Date for State Submission of the 2002 List of Impaired Waters, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 
18, 2001). 
361 Withdrawal of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regula-
tion and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in 
Support of Revisions to the Water Quality and Planning Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 13,608 
(Mar. 19, 2003). 
362 Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002). 
363 S.F. BayKeeper v. Whitman, 297 F.3d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 2002); Hayes v. Whitman, 
264 F.3d 1017, 1022–23 (10th Cir. 2001). 
364 NRDC v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001). The court did remand the case 
to EPA for an explanation of why an annual basis was appropriate in that case. 
365 Sierra Club v. Clifford, 257 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 2001). The author was the special 
master to whom the Louisiana litigation had been referred. 
366 Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1032–34 (11th Cir. 2002). 
367 Asarco, Inc. v. State, 69 P.3d 139, 145 (Idaho 2003). 
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 The litigation of the 1990s stimulated the preparation of TMDLs, 
but the current push to achieve water quality standards appears to 
have largely run its course. States and EPA have developed a large 
number of TMDLs, and that trend is likely to continue until the dead-
lines established in the various schedules and consent decrees have 
passed. But EPA is unlikely to face judicial pressure to prepare addi-
tional TMDLs. Now that the states have begun to submit TMDLs, the 
courts of appeals are increasingly holding that the “constructive sub-
mission” theory is unavailable to force preparation of loads for all wa-
ters that fail to meet water quality standards.368 Without the threat 
that EPA will be forced to prepare the TMDLs if a state fails to act, 
one reasonably can expect that states will be slow to prepare them for 
waters where achievement of water quality standards will require po-
litically difªcult choices. Moreover, the courts have shown little incli-
nation to force implementation of TMDLs once they are estab-
lished.369 Without such judicial pressure, EPA is unlikely to require 
states to establish regulatory limits on nonpoint sources for waters 
where control of those sources is necessary to achieve water quality 
standards. 
III. Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: An 
Assessment 
 Most assessments give the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
or the Clean Water Act, as it came to be called, mixed reviews.370 Fea-
sibility-based controls on point sources have signiªcantly reduced the 
pollutants in the efºuent those sources discharge, but the Act has not 
achieved either of its principal goals: It has not eliminated all dis-
charges into the navigable waters, nor has it produced ªshable and 
swimmable waters throughout the United States. Furthermore, the 
Act has failed to establish an effective system of ambient-based con-
trols for those areas where feasibility-based controls have failed to 
achieve water quality standards; in addition, no effective regulatory 
system addresses water pollution from nonpoint sources. 
                                                                                                                      
368 See supra note 363 and accompanying text. 
369 See supra note 366 and accompanying text. 
370 Two recent symposia have focused on the Clean Water Act. See Symposium, The 
Clean Water Act at Thirty: Progress, Problems, Potential, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 537 (2004); Sympo-
sium, The Clean Water Act Turns 30: Celebrating Its Past, Predicting Its Future, 33 Envtl. L. 27 
(2003). 
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 The reduction in discharges from point sources has been sub-
stantial.371 The waste streams in nearly all publicly owned treatment 
works are now subject to secondary treatment before they are dis-
charged into navigable waters. Moreover, the restraints imposed on 
industrial point sources go beyond BPT—the functional equivalent of 
secondary treatment. For conventional pollutants, these sources must 
satisfy standards based on BCT; for other pollutants, BAT deªnes the 
efºuent limit. As a result, far fewer pollutants are entering the na-
tion’s waters from municipal or industrial sources. 
 The most obvious shortcoming of the Clean Water Act standards 
is the failure to achieve the no-discharge goal372 of the 1972 Amend-
ments. The exceptions to the goal began in the deªnitional section, 
which conªned the goal to discharges from point sources.373 Even 
within the regulated category, no-discharge has proved an unattain-
able goal. The 1977 Amendments saw a de facto abandonment of the 
goal in the creation of the conventional pollutant category,374 the ac-
ceptance of the BAT strategy for toxic pollutants,375 and the exception 
for publicly owned treatment works discharging into ocean waters.376 
Four years later, Congress even eliminated the second stage of pollut-
ant controls for publicly owned treatment works.377 In short, the vi-
sion of “Spaceship Earth” with no throughputs378 proved ªnancially 
unattainable for wastewater streams. 
 The Clean Water Act also has failed to produce clean water 
throughout the nation, whether cleanliness is deªned by the federal 
goal of ªshable and swimmable waters379 or the water quality stan-
                                                                                                                      
371 EPA, Water Quality Trading: Proposed Water Quality Trading Policy (“By 1990 over 87% 
of the major municipal facilities and 93% of major industrial facilities were in compliance 
with NPDES permit limits.”), at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/proptrade 
policy.html (last updated Dec. 16, 2004); Houck, supra note 1, at 3–4 (“By any measure—
number of dischargers on permit, pounds of pollution abated, stream segments improved, 
ªsheries restored to waters where they had [not] been seen for decades—the [Clean Wa-
ter] Act has made its case in court and, by its imitation, to the world.”). 
372 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
373 See id. § 1362(12). 
374 Id. § 1311(b); see supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. 
375 Id. § 1317; see supra notes 229, 241–45 and accompanying text. 
376 Id. § 1311(h); see supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
377  Id. § 1311(b), repealed by Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant 
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, sec. 21(b), 95 Stat. 1623, 1632; see supra note 
272 and accompanying text. 
378 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in Envi-
ronmental Quality in a Growing Environment 3 (Henry Jarrett ed., 1971). 
379 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). 
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dards established by the states.380 Section 302381 has proved unwork-
able, leaving EPA no practical mechanism to implement the ªshable 
and swimmable standard. For a brief period in the 1990s, litigation 
forced EPA and the states to begin preparing TMDLs to achieve state 
water quality standards,382 but the burst of energy for ambient-based 
controls seems to be waning. The individual control strategies re-
quired by the 1987 Amendments involved an innovative attempt to 
focus on waters impaired by discharges of toxic pollutants from point 
sources.383 The ºaw in the process was the lack of clear statutory lan-
guage imposing an ongoing obligation to achieve water quality stan-
dards for toxic pollutants so long as point sources were responsible 
for the failure to achieve those standards. 
 Economists and others frequently have objected to the inefªciency 
of the feasibility-based controls of the Clean Water Act.384 Feasibility-
based standards, they claim, have forced “treatment for treatment’s 
sake” by requiring the installation of expensive pollution control 
equipment even when it is not needed to achieve desired water quality 
in less polluted areas. Even where feasibility-based controls do improve 
water quality, these critics assert that the costs of the controls often ex-
ceed the beneªts they produce. Finally, they argue that imposing 
stricter feasibility-based standards on new sources discourages construc-
tion of new plants which, even absent the stricter requirements, are al-
most always environmentally superior to existing ones. 
 Of course, the criticism in the preceding paragraph is a challenge 
more to the goals of the Clean Water Act rather than to its success or 
failure in implementing those goals. Moreover, the criticism ignores 
the political and practical virtues of feasibility-based controls. Politi-
cally, feasibility-based controls are attractive both to the regulated 
community and to heavily populated states with numerous pollution 
sources because they impose the same pollution costs on all polluters 
and they avoid widespread economic dislocation. Practically, feasibil-
ity-based controls are easier to establish and to enforce than ambient-
based controls. As a result, they are more likely to be implemented. 
                                                                                                                      
380 Id. § 1313(a). 
381 Id. § 1312. 
382 See supra notes 339–58 and accompanying text. 
383 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(l); supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text. 
384 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, Economics, Environmental 
Policy, and the Quality of Life 212–14 (1979) (recommending a cost-beneªt strategy); 
Note, Technology-Based Emission and Efºuent Standards and the Achievement of Ambient Envi-
ronmental Standards, 91 Yale L.J. 792, 792 (1982). 
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Despite the many qualiªcations that have been made to feasibility-
based standards under the Clean Water Act, they have achieved far 
more signiªcant reductions in water pollution than any of the ambi-
ent-based controls. Indeed, much of the power of the economic cri-
tique comes from comparing the imperfect and partial reform that 
feasibility-based controls have achieved with the ideal state that would 
be achieved if water quality standards were perfectly implemented.385
 Ultimately, the imperfections of the Clean Water Act reºect a 
failure of political will. Congress has lacked the courage to pursue ei-
ther of the principal ambitions of the statute. When the statute’s fea-
sibility-based provisions have offended powerful constituencies, Con-
gress has consistently created exceptions to them. At the same time, 
Congress has been unwilling to supplement the feasibility-based con-
trols with an ambient-based system that will achieve either the ªshable 
and swimmable goal proclaimed in the statute or the water quality 
standards established by the states. 
IV. Lessons for Future Regulation 
 The history of water pollution control legislation in the United 
States over the last ªve-and-a-half decades presents a mixed picture of 
success and failure. From that history, however, one can distill a vari-
ety of fundamental lessons regarding the potential and the pitfalls of 
water pollution legislation, and indeed of other forms of environ-
mental regulation. The discussion that follows examines twenty such 
lessons, grouping them into the overlapping categories of regulatory 
philosophy, regulatory strategy, and regulatory implementation. 
A. Lessons of Regulatory Philosophy 
1. Eliminating Public Perception of Water Bodies as a Commons Is 
Essential to Achieving Regulatory Goals 
 When regulated entities assume they are entitled to use water 
bodies as a disposal source, they naturally demand that the burden of 
limiting that use fall on the government.386 By contrast, the burden of 
justifying activity that degrades a resource naturally falls on the person 
                                                                                                                      
385 See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efªciency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and “Fine Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267, 1314 (1985). 
386 See generally Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968) (ex-
amining public versus private rights). 
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causing the degradation when water bodies are seen as a separate 
thing owned collectively by the public. 
 In the United States, pollution from nonpoint sources presents 
the most obvious example of this resistance to effective water pollu-
tion control. In part, the exclusion of nonpoint sources arises from 
the difªculty of controlling pollution that enters water bodies from 
diffuse rather than discrete sources, but the philosophical basis runs 
much deeper. United States environmental law has always backed 
away from direct federal control of land use, and land use controls are 
the basis for effective control of water pollution from nonpoint 
sources. Nowhere is this aversion to federal land use regulation more 
ingrained than with respect to agricultural pollution.387 Agricultural 
runoff escapes regulation as pollution from a nonpoint source, but 
Congress has even excluded obvious point sources such as irrigation 
return ºows and agricultural stormwater drainage from the federal 
regulatory system.388 United States water pollution law apparently ac-
cepts that farmers are free to use their land as they see ªt even if those 
uses adversely affect water quality. Of course, this reluctance to im-
pose pollution control costs on agriculture is not limited to water pol-
lution. In a variety of areas, United States environmental law treats 
agricultural enterprises more favorably than other businesses that im-
pose externalities on the community as a whole.389
2. Cost-Beneªt Analysis Is a Barrier to Effective Regulation 
 Regulated entities frequently appeal to cost-beneªt analysis to 
defeat or to delay regulation, arguing that it is a prerequisite to ra-
                                                                                                                      
387 See supra notes 111–14, 232–34 and accompanying text. 
388 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); see supra note 234 and accompanying text; see also Fishermen 
Against the Destruction of the Env’t, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (farm’s discharge to lake falls within agricultural exemptions of the Clean Water 
Act even though the stormwater discharged by the farm is pumped into the lake rather 
than ºowing naturally). But see Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma 
Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (manure-spreading vehicles, manure-spreading 
ªelds, and ditches used to store or transfer waste from livestock operations are point 
sources because they are part of concentrated animal feeding operations). For a proposal 
to extend the regulatory reach of the Clean Water Act to pollution from agricultural 
sources, see Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a 
Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 21 
(2002). For a favorable analysis of EPA regulations covering concentrated animal feeding 
operations, see Rebecca P. Lewandowski, Note, Spreading the Liability Net: Overcoming Agri-
cultural Exemption with EPA’s Proposed Co-Permitting Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 
Vt. L. Rev. 149 (2002). 
389 See generally Ruhl, supra note 111. 
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tional pollution control. However, Professor Rodgers demonstrated 
more than twenty years ago that costs rationally may be considered in 
a variety of ways without engaging in formal cost-beneªt analysis.390 In 
the Clean Water Act391 and other environmental statutes,392 Congress 
frequently has directed EPA to consider costs in relation to their im-
pact on the ªnancial viability of polluters who will have to bear the 
expenses of pollution control. 
 The 1965 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act show the dangers of the cost-beneªt approach for water pollution 
control.393 After seven years, states had adopted some water quality 
standards but almost no reductions in pollution loadings. Had the 
process continued, one reasonably could have anticipated many more 
years of arguments about how great a reduction in pollution was re-
quired and who should bear the costs of those reductions.394
 The demand for formal cost-beneªt analyses of environmental 
regulations began with an executive order by President Reagan. 395  
Throughout the 1980s, the Ofªce of Management and Budget 
(OMB) used the executive order to delay and to dilute environmental 
regulations.396 At times, the OMB even enforced the executive order 
in ºagrant violation of statutory mandates.397
 Perhaps the most important objection to the demand for formal 
cost-beneªt analysis stems from recognition that the uncertain process 
of calculating costs and beneªts makes the analysis highly manipu-
lable.398 Given the concentrated costs and diffuse beneªts of any par-
                                                                                                                      
390 William H. Rodgers, Beneªts, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health & Environmental De-
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397 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986). 
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ticular environmental regulation, 399  dispassionate consideration of 
costs and beneªts seems unlikely. Thus, United States water pollution 
law has wisely accepted the precautionary principle,400 a preference 
for avoiding environmental degradation when avoidance is possible 
without serious damage to the macroeconomic system. 
3. Politics Drives Regulatory Legislation 
 Certainly, the growth of an environmental movement was critical 
to securing the Clean Water Act and other environmental legislation 
of the 1970s, but particular political realities have exerted—and con-
tinue to exert—a major inºuence on federal water pollution control 
legislation for three decades. The speciªc political compromise that 
produced the 1972 legislation401 has continued to shape the federal 
framework even though nonpoint sources are responsible for an in-
creasing share of contemporary water pollution problems. 
 The political imperative to minimize displacement of state and 
local law402 has been a signiªcant barrier to the achievement of water 
quality standards throughout the last third of the twentieth century.403 
To alleviate the water quality problems that remain in the United 
States, regulators should use a water basin approach.404 But many of 
the nation’s water basins cross state lines, and so effective controls re-
quire cooperation not only between states and the federal govern-
ment, but also among states. A far easier model would be a federal 
agency with authority to establish regulations for water basins that 
cross state lines. 
                                                                                                                      
Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, Georgetown Envtl. L. & Policy Inst., Pricing 
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companying text. 
402 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). 
403 See supra notes 141, 145, 212–16 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 131–45 
and accompanying text. 
404 See generally Bob Doppelt et al., Entering the Watershed: A New Approach to 
Save America’s River Ecosystems (1993). 
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 The reluctance to impose meaningful regulations on farmers405 is 
another product of political reality. It originates with the need to in-
clude the farming states of the Midwest in the coalition that produced 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and its 
subsequent modiªcations. 
 For a brief period, the judicial mandate to prepare TMDLs raised 
hopes that a new political coalition of environmentalists and point 
source dischargers might develop a meaningful ambient-based ap-
proach to water pollution control. Those hopes, however, have faded 
as recent decisions seem less likely to force aggressive actions.406
4. Research Is Important 
 Lack of scientiªc information has frustrated the achievement of 
the goals of the Clean Water Act in many ways. In establishing feasibil-
ity-based standards, EPA generally had to rely on information sup-
plied by the regulated industries; those industries had obvious incen-
tives to exaggerate the costs and to question the effectiveness of 
alternatives to current industry practices. As attention has shifted to 
water quality standards, a principal obstacle to achieving clean water is 
scientiªc uncertainty. EPA and the states lack reliable information 
about the actual state of water quality as well as about the complicated 
processes of achieving the desired water quality. Governmental fund-
ing of research should be seen not as a subsidy to regulated indus-
tries, but as a check on their claims that effective controls are impos-
sible or infeasible. 
B. Lessons of Regulatory Strategy 
1. An Environmental Impetus Is Necessary to Produce Statutory and 
Regulatory Reform 
 In the United States, neither an organized environmental move-
ment nor a gradually worsening environmental problem has been 
sufªcient to produce signiªcant statutory and regulatory reform. The 
system seems to require some external event to convince the relevant 
political groups that change is required. Frequently, some environ-
mental mishap serves this function.407
                                                                                                                      
405 See supra notes 111–14, 232–34 and accompanying text. 
406 See supra notes 359–69 and accompanying text. 
407 The best known examples involve the environmental remediation statutes. The Tor-
rey Canyon and Santa Barbara oil spills led to the 1970 oil pollution statutes, see supra text 
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 In the case of the Clean Water Act, well-publicized incidents like 
the burning of the Cuyahoga River408 coincided with Supreme Court 
decisions reviving the Refuse Act.409 Together, they helped prompt 
Congress to take a dramatic new approach to water pollution control 
in 1972.410
 By contrast, no similar urgency has driven the statutory revisions 
since 1972; not surprisingly, they have produced only incremental 
changes. In 1977, the regulated community feared costs and dead-
lines, while environmentalists lamented the slow progress on toxic 
pollutants. The result was a compromise. Polluters got relief from 
costs and deadlines, and Congress directed EPA to establish BAT 
standards for at least sixty-ªve toxic pollutants.411 The 1981 Amend-
ments came at the beginning of the Reagan presidency. Congress re-
duced the federal share for construction grants, but exempted pub-
licly owned treatment works from the requirement to go beyond 
secondary treatment.412 The 1987 Amendments continued the pat-
tern of extended deadlines and reduced funding. 413  Congress im-
proved administrative enforcement and made gestures toward ambi-
ent-based standards and controls.414 But without a political imperative 
for fundamental change, neither of the ambient-based reforms had 
much substance. 
2. Regulatory Paradigms Can Become Too Entrenched 
 This lesson is the reverse of the previous one. When reform does 
occur, the particular regulatory strategy chosen is likely to endure 
long after the problems that produced it are no longer the most im-
portant ones. While this situation may afºict regulators in many a le-
                                                                                                                      
accompanying notes 52–53; the Exxon Valdez disaster prompted the 1990 statute, see supra 
note 53; and the Love Canal incident was instrumental in producing the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601–9675 (2000). 
See Jeffrey G. Miller & Craig N. Johnston, The Law of Hazardous Waste Disposal 
and Remediation 8 (1996). 
408 See David Zwick & Marcy Benstock, Water Wasteland 1 (1971). For an argu-
ment that the “fable” of the burning Cuyahoga River has been widely misunderstood, see 
Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection, 
14 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 89 (2002). 
409 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175 (2001) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
410 See supra notes 70–98 and accompanying text. 
411 See discussion supra Part I.C.1. 
412 See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
413 See supra notes 276–85 and accompanying text. 
414 See supra notes 286–330 and accompanying text. 
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gal ªeld, it certainly is acute in the continually evolving environmental 
arena. At least since 1988,415 informed observers have recognized that 
solving the water pollution problems in the United States requires 
ambient-based efºuent standards and controls on nonpoint sources. 
However, the feasibility-based focus on the Clean Water Act has made 
it difªcult, if not impossible, for EPA to solve either of these problems. 
At the same time, the exclusion of nonpoint sources from the regula-
tory framework has made it more difªcult to develop effective trading 
schemes that could reduce the cost of attaining water quality stan-
dards in waters where feasibility-based controls are insufªcient to 
achieve the ambient standards. 
3. A Regulatory Floor Is Essential to Achieving Water Quality Goals 
 Without a regulatory base, environmental improvement is un-
likely to occur. Indeed, the absence of regulation perversely favors the 
polluter that can externalize some of its costs to the environment. 
The contrast between point and nonpoint sources provides an in-
structive example. Pollution loads from point sources have dimin-
ished as publicly owned treatment works have implemented secon-
dary treatment and industrial polluters have complied with feasibility-
based requirements to implement best practicable technology, best 
conventional technology, and best available technology. As a result, 
pollution from nonpoint sources constitutes an ever greater portion 
of the remaining pollution, and EPA has no effective mechanism to 
address the problem. No analogous, feasibility-based requirements 
apply to nonpoint sources of water pollution. In 1972, Congress sub-
stituted area-wide planning for regulation of nonpoint sources;416 the 
1977 Amendments offered to pay some of the costs that farmers 
would incur by instituting best management practices;417 and the 1987 
Amendments required new state plans for controlling nonpoint 
sources without mandating the use of regulatory controls.418 None of 
                                                                                                                      
415 See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide of Water Quality, 15 Ecology L.Q. 69 
(1988). 
416 See supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. 
417 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
418 See supra notes 297–304 and accompanying text. The 1990 Amendments to the 
Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1465 (2000), require states with feder-
ally approved coastal zone management programs to develop “management measures for 
nonpoint source pollution to restore and protect coastal waters.” Id. § 1455b(a)(1). To 
receive federal approval, a state program must include “management measures” that will 
“protect coastal waters.” Id. 
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these approaches has produced a reduction in pollution from non-
point sources comparable to the reductions achieved by point 
sources. Unless EPA is granted authority to impose enforceable regu-
lations on nonpoint sources, the TMDLs now being prepared also are 
likely to fail to achieve water quality standards in areas where non-
point sources are a major portion of the water quality problem. 
4. Ambient-Based Controls Are Ultimately Needed to Achieve 
Ambient Goals 
 Feasibility-based controls are unlikely to bring the environment 
to optimal conditions. Eliminating all pollution is extremely expen-
sive even when it is technologically achievable, and so the regulated 
community is likely to be successful when it resists higher levels of fea-
sibility-based controls unless they are necessary to protect public 
health. As a result, additional ambient-based controls will be needed 
to achieve ambient goals in areas of pollution concentration. 
 Some of the failures of the Clean Water Act illustrate this need 
for ambient-based controls. Because nonpoint sources remained out-
side the regulatory framework, some water pollution problems would 
have remained in the United States even if the no-discharge goal of 
the Clean Water Act419 had been achieved. Moreover, the costs associ-
ated with the complete elimination of pollution in waste streams 
made the no-discharge goal impractical in most cases. Without an en-
forceable scheme of ambient-based controls, the failure of many water 
bodies to satisfy water quality statutes was predictable in the 1970s and 
is veriªable today. 
5. Unexpected Consequences Will Require Revision to the 
Regulatory Scheme 
 Beyond expecting that most regulated entities will seek to ad-
vance their own self-interest, no legislator or administrator can accu-
rately predict how individuals will respond to the mix of incentives 
and penalties that a regulatory system entails. Consequently, the need 
for mid-term correction of regulatory programs is always foreseeable. 
 The construction grant program for publicly owned treatment 
works aptly illustrates this phenomenon. The program aimed to en-
able local governments to achieve secondary treatment of their exist-
ing discharges. Many local governments, however, used it to expand 
                                                                                                                      
419 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1); see supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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systems to support development in ways that actually increased pollu-
tion loadings. 
 The controls on toxic pollutants provide another example from 
the Clean Water Act. Originally, section 307 required elimination of 
all dangerous discharges of toxic pollutants. When attaining the goal 
proved both scientiªcally difªcult and extremely expensive, Congress 
adopted a pragmatic compromise. It substituted a strict, feasibility-
based limit that applied to a broad array of toxic pollutants. 
6. State and Local Governments Are Unlikely to Install Adequate 
Pollution Controls Without Financial Assistance from the National 
Government 
 The Clean Water Act documents the importance of ªnancial as-
sistance to governmental polluters. Most publicly owned treatment 
works now use secondary treatment only because the federal govern-
ment paid the lion’s share of the cost of constructing the new treat-
ment facilities.420 Local governments have been much slower to treat 
stormwater discharges because they have had to bear the cost. Local 
governments face especially great demands on their limited resources. 
Environmental impacts usually are a cumulative product of many 
sources, and polluters frequently can impose the bulk of a pollution 
problem on those downstream. Not surprisingly, therefore, the bene-
ªts of environmental expenditures are likely to receive a lower priority 
than other expenditures whose beneªts are concentrated more lo-
cally. Given the difªculties of forcing environmental compliance on 
governmental actors, cost sharing seems a desirable way to obtain 
compliance from local entities. 
7. Effective Enforcement Is an Essential Element of a Successful 
Regulatory Scheme 
 Without effective enforcement alternatives, environmental regu-
lations perversely favor those who ºout regulatory requirements. 
Congress always has been more willing to legislate hortatory language 
and even strict regulatory requirements than to establish effective en-
forcement mechanisms, but the United States has made progress to-
ward effective enforcement.421 The 1948 and 1956 legislation estab-
                                                                                                                      
420 See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. For a summary of some of the ex-
ceptions to the pretreatment requirement, see supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. 
421 See generally William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Pre-
scription for Vigorous Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 202 (1987). 
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lished an awkward conferencing system for combating interstate pol-
lution problems,422 and the 1965 Amendments provided for the estab-
lishment of water quality standards without a system for mandating 
enforceable controls on those whose pollution resulted in waters that 
failed to meet the standards.423 Real progress began with the 1972 
Amendments; they authorized substantial civil penalties as well as 
criminal prosecutions, 424  even though they required costly judicial 
actions to impose the sanctions. Even more importantly, the 1972 
statute authorized environmental groups to enforce the statute when 
EPA failed to perform its responsibilities.425 The 1987 Amendments 
made administrative enforcement more meaningful by authorizing 
administrative imposition of civil penalties.426
 The main defect in the current system for enforcing the Clean 
Water Act is the lack of a mechanism for ensuring uniform levels of 
enforcement across the nation. Funding limitations force EPA to con-
centrate on major rather than routine violations. Thus, the conse-
quences for violating federal water pollution control requirements 
vary according to the political dynamics of individual states. At a 
minimum, the federal government should ensure enforcement that 
captures the economic gain that the polluter realized from its non-
compliance. Ideally, the federal government should assume responsi-
bility for taking enforcement action against all violations of federal 
law. If a state retains primary responsibility for enforcement, EPA 
should have sufªcient resources to allow the agency to take effective 
action when the state’s response is inadequate. 
C. Lessons of Regulatory Implementation 
1. Feasibility-Based Controls Are the Most Effective Way to Achieve 
Prompt Reductions in Pollution Loadings 
 The imposition of best practicable and secondary treatment con-
trols produced dramatic reductions in pollution loadings from point 
sources.427 Even today, the most obvious way to reduce pollution load-
                                                                                                                      
422 See supra notes 17–31 and accompanying text. 
423 See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
424 See supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. 
425 See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
426 See supra notes 315–24 and accompanying text. 
427 See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objec-
tives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 Envtl. L. 29, 48 (2003). 
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ings in impaired waters substantially is to require nonpoint sources to 
comply with best management practices, a rough equivalent to the 
best practicable control technology imposed on point sources. The 
scientiªc, ªnancial, and political obstacles to achieving water quality 
standards in the most polluted waters of the United States are 
signiªcant; they would be substantially reduced if controls on non-
point sources were similar to the ones that the 1972 legislation re-
quired point sources to implement by 1977. 
2. Feasibility-Based Controls Are Unlikely to Eliminate Substantially 
All Pollution 
 A variety of technological, economic, and political factors con-
tribute to this conclusion. The technology for elimination of all pollu-
tion is scientiªcally complex and seldom commercially viable. At a 
minimum, it is very expensive, and the costs generally fall on politi-
cally powerful constituencies. 
 The dream of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 was to eliminate discharges from point sources. None 
of the feasibility-based standards of the Clean Water Act was successful 
in imposing zero discharge limits for all pollutants. Moreover, the cost 
of moving from best practicable technology (the average of existing 
plants) to best available technology (the best of existing plants) often 
produced only modest reductions in pollution loads at very high 
costs. Given this reality, the compromise of the Clean Water Act— 
avoiding these costs for common pollutants except where necessary to 
achieve water quality standards—makes sense. Unfortunately, the 
Clean Water Act failed to complement this reasonable concession to 
reality with a meaningful program of ambient-based controls. 
3. Exceptions to the Regulated Universe Are Likely to Frustrate 
Achieving the Desired Ambient Environment 
 Feasibility-based controls require uniform reductions among 
classes of polluters. If one group of polluters is exempted from the 
feasibility-based standards, those entities that have already incurred 
control costs will have to pay higher costs to achieve ambient goals in 
heavily polluted areas. 
 Nonpoint sources offer the most obvious example from water 
pollution control regulation of the danger of exemptions to the regu-
lated universe. The 1972 decision to exempt nonpoint sources from 
regulatory controls was rooted in political compromise, but justiªed 
on policy grounds: the inability to treat pollution from diffuse non-
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point sources and the difªculty of enforcing controls on nonpoint 
sources.428 Although each policy justiªcation contained a kernel of 
truth, neither obstacle renders it impossible to establish enforceable 
controls on pollution from nonpoint sources. Together, however, they 
have been employed to justify the continued exclusion of pollution 
from nonpoint sources from the regulatory system even though that 
exclusion means that water quality goals cannot be achieved in many 
areas. Indeed, now that substantial controls have been placed on 
point sources, the exclusion of nonpoint sources has become the 
primary reason why so many waters still fail to achieve water quality 
standards. 
 Similarly, the statutory and regulatory exceptions to the universe 
of point sources have increased the number of water quality-related 
problems. The most obvious example here is the congressional exclu-
sion of agricultural stormwater discharges and return ºows from irri-
gated agriculture from the deªnition of point source. 429  If those 
sources had to get discharge permits, those permits would have to 
contain limits that would ensure that the discharges did not cause vio-
lations of water quality standards.430
4. Indirect Regulations Rarely Produce Optimal Results 
 Regulations encourage regulated entities to minimize the cost of 
compliance. When regulations attack a problem indirectly, regulated 
entities gain additional room for maneuvering. 
 The section 404 program is probably the best example from the 
Clean Water Act of the phenomenon of indirect regulation. The pri-
mary reason for a separate dredge and ªll permit program was to al-
low the Corps of Engineers to continue to control navigation. Once 
the program expanded to include wetlands, environmentalists began 
to use it to protect the other environmental values. Unfortunately, 
however, the program is still tied to the deposit of dredge and ªll ma-
terials rather than to the environmental impacts of development ac-
tivities on the wetlands. As a result, developers often can bypass the 
permit requirement by destroying the wetland character of an area 
before they begin their developments. 
                                                                                                                      
428 See Menell & Stewart, supra note 175, at 505. 
429 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000); see supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
430 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
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5. Judicial Innovation Can Stimulate Legislative and Administrative 
Action 
 The pattern of judicial innovation leading regulatory reform is 
one frequently repeated in federal water pollution control regula-
tion.431 From the interpretation of the Refuse Act,432 to the inclusion 
of wetlands within the section 404 permit program, 433  to the best 
available technology approach to toxic pollutants,434 to the revival of 
water quality standards, 435  innovative judicial interpretations have 
prompted new reforms. The judicial opinions generally have not pro-
vided the ªnal reform, but they often have stimulated further legisla-
tive revisions or new regulations. For those who hope for new water-
quality-based controls, the judiciary’s retreat from demanding effec-
tive TMDLs is a discouraging sign that the acceptance of poor water 
quality may continue for the foreseeable future. 
6. Delays in Achieving Regulatory Goals Are Inevitable 
 In water pollution legislation, Congress frequently has set ambi-
tious goals that EPA regularly has failed to meet on the schedule set 
by the legislation. The reasons for these failures include scientiªc un-
certainty, insufªcient agency resources, and use of legal remedies by 
the regulated community to postpone costs that cannot be avoided. 
The problem is one that water pollution control legislation never has 
addressed effectively. The list of deadlines that have been missed is 
long. It includes identiªcation of toxic pollutants and pollutants for 
which TMDLs are appropriate, promulgation of discharge limits for 
toxic pollutants, establishment of feasibility-based standards, designa-
tion of water bodies that fail to meet water quality standards, and es-
tablishment of TMDLs. On this point, the Clean Water Act could 
proªtably follow the lead of the 1984 Amendments to the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act. Under that statute, failure to meet 
regulatory deadlines triggered strict statutory standards rather than 
continuing the status quo.436
                                                                                                                      
431 See generally Houck, supra note 55 (discussing cases interpreting water pollution 
regulations). 
432 See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text. 
433 See supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text. 
434 See supra notes 185–93 and accompanying text. 
435 See discussion supra Part II. 
436 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(6)(C) (2000). 
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7. Federalism Encourages Cumbersome Approaches to 
Environmental Regulation 
 The commitment to preserve state authority whenever possible437 
makes it extremely difªcult to establish a national program to achieve 
ambient environmental goals. When environmental problems do not 
always follow state boundaries, state regulators can have a parochial 
view of the problem. The complicated procedure of state submission 
of environmental regulations for federal approval is a cumbersome 
process at best. Moreover, the limited ability of the federal govern-
ment to force compliance with federal mandates or to enforce stan-
dards once they have been set exacerbates the ineffectiveness of the 
process. 
 The “cooperative federalism” of water pollution control legisla-
tion illustrates each of these obstacles to an effective national pro-
gram to improve water quality. The great river basins transcend state 
lines. However, states issue the permits that translate federal technol-
ogy-based standards into speciªc efºuent limits,438 and states are the 
primary drafters of the controls necessary to bring waters to accept-
able levels of water quality.439 Of course, states have to submit their 
permit programs and regulations to EPA for approval, but that proc-
ess of review, revision, and approval delays rather than advances com-
pliance dates. The federal government’s limited coercive authority 
accentuates the tendency toward delays; in some cases, EPA’s legal 
authority to require effective regulations is unclear 440  or nonexis-
tent.441 But even when EPA’s legal authority is unquestioned, certain 
practicalities limit the options of the federal agency. EPA can revoke a 
state’s delegation of authority to administer the discharge permit 
program under section 402,442 but Congress has not funded or staffed 
the federal agency to administer the programs when states fail. As a 
                                                                                                                      
437 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000) (recognizing, preserving, and protecting “the 
primary responsibilities and rights of states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution”). 
438 See id. § 1342(b); supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
439 33 U.S.C. § 1251; see supra notes 131–41 and accompanying text. 
440 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (requiring EPA to prepare TMDLs when EPA disapproved a 
state submission, but making no express provision for the failure of the state to submit a 
TMDL). 
441 Nothing in the CWA authorizes EPA to establish regulatory limits on nonpoint 
sources of pollution, even when such limits are needed to achieve water quality standards. 
442 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(C). In 2003, EPA initiated an investigation into whether it 
should revoke the delegation to Louisiana of permit authority under section 402. See EPA 
Wants Change in La. DEQ: Agency Threatens to Strip State of Enforcement Duty, Sunday Advo-
cate (Baton Rouge, La.), Feb. 16, 2003, at B1. 
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result, EPA never has revoked a state’s authority to administer the sec-
tion 402 program when the state has failed to perform its obligations. 
Similarly, the federal government always can enforce the Clean Water 
Act,443 but EPA relies overwhelmingly on state enforcement despite 
evidence suggesting that states collect civil penalties for only a frac-
tion of the violations they discover.444
 The Mississippi River presents the most dramatic example of the 
limitations of federalism because it drains to the Gulf of Mexico from 
the Rocky Mountains in the west, Minnesota in the north, and the 
Appalachian Mountains in the east. Obviously no single state can ad-
dress these problems, and the federal response is equally fragmented. 
Essentially, the federal government is limited to review of state plans 
and state permit programs; even that review is divided among several 
EPA regions.445 The likelihood of a coordinated response from such a 
fragmented regulatory system is minimal. 
 The solution is an obvious one that perceptive observers recog-
nized in the debates that led to enactment of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1948446 and the revisions of the early 1960s.447 
Achieving clean water in interstate waterways requires a federal regu-
latory authority with the power to establish, to administer, and to en-
force water pollution controls. Unfortunately, ªve-and-a-half decades 
of legislation have conditioned the political system to continue an in-
direct approach to the problem. 
 Controls at basin levels are necessary to solve serious ambient 
quality problems. Ambient-based controls present greater scientiªc 
difªculties than feasibility-based controls. They require regulators to 
consider the interaction between multiple sources of pollution and a 
dynamic body of water. As a result, effective ambient controls require 
                                                                                                                      
443 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1), (3). But see id. § 1319(g)(6) (limiting federal authority 
to bring judicial action to assess a civil penalty when a state is diligent by prosecuting a civil 
action or a state has assessed a civil penalty under a “comparable state law”). 
444 See Andreen, supra note 7, at 229–30. 
445 The most extreme example is the Mississippi River basin, which reaches into at least 
six EPA regions. For most of its length, the Mississippi River itself is the dividing line be-
tween EPA regions. 
446 See, e.g., Brett Barrouquere, DEQ Blasted for Its Rate of Enforcement: Agency Says Not 
Every Citation Requires Penalty, Sunday Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Apr. 13, 2003, at A-1 
(indicating that Louisiana and Texas imposed civil penalties for only four percent of envi-
ronmental violations); Geoff Dutton, State EPA Criticized in Study: Enforcement Lacking, Fed-
eral Agency Says, Columbus Dispatch (Ohio), June 15, 2003, at D-1 (describing Ohio en-
forcement as “below-average”). 
447 See Andreen, supra note 7, at 251. 
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a regulatory body with authority to consider the totality of the ambi-
ent environment. 
 The Supreme Court’s exclusion of isolated wetlands from the 
deªnition of navigable waters complicates the expansion of federal 
authority on some issues but not on this one. The great river basins 
meet the traditional tests for navigability,448 and controlling the pollu-
tion of their tributaries is necessary to protect the water quality in in-
terstate waters. The failure here is one of political will, not one of le-
gal doctrine. 
 The Supreme Court decision is likely to result in wetland controls 
that are less direct and less effective. Uncertainty over the reach of the 
Court’s rationale will encourage new legal challenges. Some recent 
decisions449 suggest that most wetlands will remain subject to federal 
regulatory authority, but the issue will remain clouded until the Su-
preme Court resolves it conclusively. Moreover, states are likely to 
adopt different levels of control for wetlands that escape federal regu-
lation, and EPA has little leverage to encourage a uniªed approach.450
                                                                                                                      
448 See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
449 The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have extended Clean Wa-
ter Act jurisdiction to all water bodies with a hydrological connection to a navigable water 
body. See Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 344 F.3d 407, 417 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 972 (2004); United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
541 U.S. 972 (2004); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
541 U.S. 972 (2004). In cases involving the Oil Pollution Act, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has required a showing that the water body into which the discharge occurred was 
adjacent to a navigable water. See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2003). 
450 See 34 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2756 (2003) (announcement that federal government was 
dropping a proposed rule that would have greatly reduced the number of wetlands and 
streams subject to protection under the Clean Water Act, but that EPA and the Corps of 
Engineers would continue to use the guidance document issued at the same time as the 
proposed rule). See generally Calvert G. Chipchase, The Clean Water Act: What’s Commerce Got 
to Do with It?, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,775 (2003); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: Isolated Waters, 
Migratory Birds, Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 43 Nat. Resources J. 11 (2003); 
Funk, supra note 106; Lawrence R. Liebesman, Judicial, Administrative, and Congressional 
Responses to SWANCC, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,899 (2003); Bradford C. Mank, 
The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection Ap-
proach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 Ecology L.Q. 811 (2003); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What 
Is a Navigable Water? Canoes Count But Kayaks Do Not, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 1067 (2003); Jim 
Wedeking, To the Ends of the Earth: Where Does Navigable Water Begin Under SWANCC?, 34 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,421 (2004); Lance D. Wood, Don’t Be Misled: CWA Jurisdic-
tion Extends to All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the Traditional Navigable Waters and to Their Ad-
jacent Wetlands, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,187 (2004). 
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8. Incentives Matter 
 Governments establish regulations because environmental con-
trols increase costs of regulated entities without improving their reve-
nues. Predictably, regulated entities try to minimize those costs. Regu-
lations work most effectively when cooperation is less costly than 
deªance. 
 The Clean Water Act has few incentives to encourage compli-
ance. Feasibility-based regulations impose costs uniformly across in-
dustry groups. Because polluters defer all costs until the regulations 
are ªnally enacted, they have tended to use administrative and judi-
cial appeals to delay them for as long as possible. At the same time, 
the division of enforcement between state and federal agencies means 
that polluters frequently avoid monetary penalties for violations. Such 
a system perversely imposes no ªnancial burden on violators as com-
pared to those who have complied with the regulatory requirements. 
Finally, the complicated division of regulatory authority encourages 
states to minimize federal intrusions by securing federal approval of 
their programs, conªdent that they can delay controversial actions 
without fear that the federal government will reassume responsibility. 
 Congress and EPA should experiment with economic incentives 
in efforts to meet water quality standards. At least two possibilities are 
immediately apparent. Allowing point sources to trade pollution re-
ductions with other point sources and to purchase them from non-
point sources could be a cost-effective way to achieve water quality 
standards.451 In addition, the system should reward polluters who par-
ticipate in plans to achieve water quality standards. The government 
should exempt them from future reductions until they have had a 
reasonable time to amortize their prior investments. 
9. Individual Polluters Can Achieve Pollution Reductions Beyond 
Those that Are Likely to Be Imposed on a Category of Sources 
 Implementation of individualized controls is scientiªcally com-
plicated and time consuming. Consequently, they are best delayed 
until after the imposition of a general regulatory ºoor based on feasi-
bility-based controls. 
                                                                                                                      
451 For an example of a permit that allows trading between point sources, see 35 Env’t 
Rep. (BNA) 486 (2004) (news report of wastewater utility that was the ªrst to receive a 
single 402 permit that covered four facilities and allows for trading of pollution credits). 
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 An illustration of the potential for greater reductions from indi-
vidual sources comes from the individual control strategies required by 
section 304(l). Individual sources often can achieve reductions beyond 
the best available technology for an entire category of sources. This 
phenomenon produces some optimism that even serious water quality 
problems can be solved if the scope of the problem is ªrst reduced by 
imposing feasibility-based controls on all pollution sources that con-
tribute to water quality problems. Unfortunately, states treated the 
mandate for individual control strategies as a one-time requirement, 
and the mandate applied only to waters where point sources were caus-
ing water quality violations. It should become an ongoing requirement 
for each permit renewal for any point source. Moreover, it should be 
extended to nonpoint sources that contribute to the failure to achieve 
water quality standards in a particular water body. 
Conclusion 
 The Clean Water Act presents a mixed picture of success and 
failure. The statute has produced major reductions in efºuent dis-
charges from point sources, and Congress has established enforce-
ment mechanisms to require compliance with the regulatory stan-
dards. On the other hand, signiªcant water quality problems remain, 
and the statute has not addressed them effectively. In part, these prob-
lems result from the exclusion of nonpoint sources from the regula-
tory regime, and in part, they stem from the lack of an effective sys-
tem of ambient-based controls. 
 Ultimately, the failures of the Clean Water Act are political ones. 
Part IV of this Article suggests various ways that it could be made 
more effective, but Congress has yet to implement them. Of course, 
the current inability to build a political consensus for effective water 
pollution control may not last forever. The lessons of past efforts at 
water pollution control can equip environmentalists to advocate more 
effective solutions when reform again becomes possible. Moreover, 
the lessons also may assist with other pollution problems as well. Be-
cause the issues raised in water pollution also exist in other statutes, a 
useful hypothesis would be to generalize the lessons summarized 
above as guidelines for pollution control. Of course, testing that hy-
pothesis will require careful examination of the development and op-
eration of those other pollution control statutes. 
